Are Those Who Ignore History Doomed to Repeat It? by Decherney, Peter et al.
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
1-1-2011 
Are Those Who Ignore History Doomed to Repeat It? 
Peter Decherney 
University of Pennsylvania 
Nathan Ensmenger 
University of Texas at Austin 
Christopher S. Yoo 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Broadcast and Video Studies Commons, 
Communications Law Commons, Communication Technology and New Media Commons, Computer Law 
Commons, History of Science, Technology, and Medicine Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, 
Law and Economics Commons, Mass Communication Commons, and the Science and Technology Law 
Commons 
Repository Citation 
Decherney, Peter; Ensmenger, Nathan; and Yoo, Christopher S., "Are Those Who Ignore History Doomed to 
Repeat It?" (2011). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 394. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/394 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
1627 
REVIEW 
Are Those Who Ignore History Doomed to Repeat It? 
Peter Decherney,† Nathan Ensmenger,†† & Christopher S. Yoo‡ 
The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires 
Tim Wu. Alfred A. Knopf, 2010. Pp x, 366. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Internet has become such an integral part of people’s daily 
lives that one can easily forget how young it is. After a two-decade 
gestation period, during which the network was primarily the 
plaything of university-based computer scientists, the Internet 
exploded onto the public’s consciousness during the mid-1990s. 
During this period, the Internet was widely regarded as unlike 
anything that had ever gone before.
1
 Every month seemed to bear 
witness to a new innovation that made possible new forms of 
expression and communication. The Internet’s potential seemed 
limitless.
2
 
In recent years, the heady days of the Internet’s youth have given 
way to the more troubled days of its adolescence. Commentators have 
begun to bemoan the ways in which the Internet may actually be 
damaging the human condition.
3
 Other writers are more sanguine 
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 1 For a leading statement of Internet exceptionalism, see David R. Johnson and David 
Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 Stan L Rev 1367, 1387–91 (1996). For 
a somewhat polemical statement of this position, see John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the 
Independence of Cyberspace (Feb 8, 1996), online at http://homes.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-
Final.html (visited Apr 27, 2011). 
 2 See George Gilder, Telecosm: How Infinite Bandwidth Will Revolutionize Our World 10–11 
(Free Press 2000). 
 3 See, for example, Nicholas Carr, The Shallows: What the Internet Is Doing to Our 
Brains 190–92 (W.W. Norton 2010); Jaron Lanier, You Are Not a Gadget: A Manifesto 20 (Knopf 
2010); William Powers, Hamlet’s BlackBerry: A Practical Philosophy for Building a Good Life in 
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about the Internet’s past but harbor concerns about its future. In 
particular, these authors warn that corporate actors are threatening to 
change the Internet’s fundamental character in ways that will 
ultimately harm end users.
4
 
Tim Wu has written an important new book in this latter 
tradition. In The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information 
Empires, Wu scrutinizes the history of four of our nation’s leading 
communications technologies and identifies a disturbing pattern that 
he calls “the Cycle.” New technologies emerge swathed in the spirit of 
“revolutionary novelty and youthful utopianism” (p 6).
5
 Over time, 
consumers become dissatisfied with the quality or reliability of the 
new technology, and incumbents become concerned with the threat 
that the new technology poses to existing revenue streams (p 10). This 
in turn opens the door for a great mogul (often with the assistance of 
the federal government) to take control of the industry and make sure 
that it runs in an orderly fashion, which ushers in “a golden age in the 
life of the new technology” (p 10). In the process, the control asserted 
by this mogul transforms the technology “from a freely accessible 
channel to one strictly controlled by a single corporation or cartel—
from open to closed system”—until some new form of ingenuity starts 
the Cycle anew (p 6). 
The book offers much to admire. Wu builds his narrative around 
some of the leading figures in the history of technology, an approach 
that fits well with Wu’s natural flair for storytelling. But perhaps the 
most compelling aspect of the book is the sheer scope of its argument. 
Attempting to find a single overarching pattern in industries as 
disparate as telephony, broadcasting, motion pictures, and computers 
is ambitious. If successful, identifying a single cycle that accurately 
describes how communications technologies and business practices 
change over time would give policymakers (and the policy advocates 
attempting to persuade them) the kind of clear policy inference 
                                                                                                                      
the Digital Age 1–4 (HarperCollins 2010); John Freeman, The Tyranny of E-mail: The Four-
Thousand-Year Journey to Your Inbox 5–6 (Scribner 2009); Lee Siegel, Against the Machine: 
Being Human in the Age of the Electronic Mob 5–6 (Spiegel & Grau 2008); Andrew Keen, The 
Cult of the Amateur: How Today’s Internet Is Killing Our Culture 9 (Doubleday 2007); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Republic.com 2.0 11–18 (Princeton 2007). 
 4 See, for example, Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a 
Connected World 40–48 (Random House 2001); Siva Vaidhyanathan, The Googlization of 
Everything (and Why We Should Worry) 11–12 (California 2010); Barbara van Schewick, Internet 
Architecture and Innovation 372 (MIT 2010); Jonathan Zittrain, The Future of the Internet—and 
How to Stop It 178–85 (Yale 2008). 
 5 “Every few decades a new communications technology appears, bright with promise and 
possibility. It inspires a generation to dream of a better society, new forms of expression, 
alternative types of journalism” (p 10). 
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needed to justify the type of categorical intervention that Wu 
proposes. 
But expanding a theory’s scope can be a double-edged sword. 
While breadth of application heightens a theory’s analytical power, it 
simultaneously makes it harder to frame a theory that is consistent 
with the underlying facts. Devising a theory that accurately describes 
the considerations driving the evolution of a single industry is difficult 
enough. Developing a theory that takes into account all of the 
essential characteristics and idiosyncrasies of multiple industries 
simultaneously makes the challenge even harder. The more general 
the theory, the more difficult this problem becomes. 
The success of The Master Switch thus depends on the extent to 
which the histories of the industries on which Wu focuses actually fit 
the pattern he has identified. The first four Parts of this Review take 
each of Wu’s key industries in turn and critically examine the 
historical instances the book discusses as well as the portions of the 
historical record that are not mentioned. Part V discusses the broader 
theoretical literature exploring some of the nuances lost by attempting 
to draw a single conclusion that spans all four of these industries. We 
recognize that Wu’s book is aimed at a popular rather than a scholarly 
audience, and we applaud Wu’s attempt to identify patterns in the 
manner in which different technology-oriented industries evolve. 
Nonetheless, a close examination of the historical episodes that serve 
as the foundation for Wu’s argument suggests that the Cycle Wu has 
identified represents just one of many possible cycles. A more 
complex vision of the mechanisms driving these cycles would yield 
new insights into which policy levers to pull and when. 
I.  TELEPHONE 
Wu traces the telephone industry through what he sees as three 
distinct turns of the Cycle. Although Wu’s arguments invite readers to 
regard all three as examples of the same phenomenon, closer 
inspection reveals that each episode reflects a different definition of 
openness, a different vision of the mechanism by which an industry 
becomes open or closed, and a more complex picture of how the 
federal government influences the way technology evolves.  
A. The Rise and Fall of Independent Telephony 
The first turn of the Cycle began with the rise of Bell’s relatively 
small, regional competitors—to whom Wu refers as “Independents”—
1630 The University of Chicago Law Review [78:1627 
following the expiration of the initial Bell patents in 1894.
6
 Often 
overlooked, this important era was largely the result of a mistake in 
business strategy by the Bell System. Patterning itself after the 
telegraph system, the telephone system focused on establishing long-
distance connections between large financial centers and ignored rural 
areas, smaller metropolitan areas, and even suburban areas around 
cities.
7
 Under this vision, the telephone was exclusively an instrument 
of commerce. Early Bell System executives never envisioned the 
extent to which people would want telephones in their own homes for 
purely social reasons.
8
 
Bell’s strategy created a skeletal network that left wide stretches 
of virgin territory within which the Independents could operate freely. 
This led to what Wu regards as the first great era of openness in the 
telephone industry. The low entry costs allowed local telephone 
companies competing directly with the Bell System to flourish (p 46). 
In 1907 and 1908, the Independents had captured more than 50 
percent of the national market.
9
  
Wu regards the Independents as being infused with a different 
ethos than Bell in that they saw the telephone as cheaper, more 
                                                                                                                      
 6 See Daniel F. Spulber and Christopher S. Yoo, Mandating Access to Telecom and the 
Internet: The Hidden Side of Trinko, 107 Colum L Rev 1822, 1892–96 (2007); Daniel F. Spulber 
and Christopher S. Yoo, Toward a Unified Theory of Access to Local Telephone Systems, 61 Fed 
Comm L J 43, 63–65 (2008). Wu actually begins his narrative with a prologue reviewing the 
telephone industry’s initial struggle to displace the telegraph industry. According to Wu, Western 
Union, like the Greek Titan Kronos, attempted to thwart the emergence of potential successors 
by consuming them (p 25). If so, Western Union’s initial imitation of Kronos was very poor: as 
Wu mentions in passing, Western Union declined an offer to purchase the Bell telephone patents 
for $100,000 (p 31). (Ironically, Western Union would later offer 250 times that amount, only to 
be rebuffed and ultimately absorbed by the Bell System, instead of the other way around.) 
Western Union’s attempt to defend its turf was ultimately frustrated not by the Theodore Vail–
type mogul envisioned by Wu’s theory but rather by patent litigation and an auspiciously timed 
assault on Western Union courtesy of financier Jay Gould. Moreover, the fall of Western Union 
was not followed by the expected generation of dreamers experimenting with ways that the new 
technology might transform society (pp 6, 10). Instead, it was the displacement of one closed 
system by another closed system that was itself roundly criticized for its lack of innovation and 
penchant for control. 
 7 Milton L. Mueller Jr, Universal Service: Competition, Interconnection, and Monopoly in 
the Making of the American Telephone System 39–42, 55, 59 (MIT 1997); David F. Weiman and Richard 
C. Levin, Preying for Monopoly? The Case of Southern Bell Telephone Company, 1894–1912, 102 J Pol 
Econ 103, 106–07 (1994). 
 8 See Mueller, Universal Service at 77–78 (cited in note 7). 
 9 See US Census Bureau, Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970 
part 2 at 783 (GPO Bicentennial ed 1975) (reporting a total of 3.1 million Independent 
telephones and 3.0 million Bell telephones in 1907 and a total of 3.3 million Independent 
telephones and 3.2 million Bell telephones in 1908). See also Robert Bornholz and David S. 
Evans, The Early History of Competition in the Telephone Industry, in David S. Evans, ed, 
Breaking Up Bell: Essays on Industrial Organization and Regulation 7, 13 (North-Holland 1983); 
Richard Gabel, The Early Competitive Era in Telephone Communications, 1893–1920, 34 L & 
Contemp Probs 340, 344 (1969). 
2011] Are Those Who Ignore History Doomed to Repeat It? 1631 
common, less commercial, and more open (pp 46–47). Although 
associating the Independents with such values fits nicely into his 
narrative, doing so elides an important distinction within the 
Independent movement. One part of the movement was composed of 
cooperatives established by farmers in largely rural areas that 
reflected the values that Wu suggests.
10
 The more established wing of 
the Independent movement, however, consisted of firms backed by 
successful merchants, bankers, and business leaders who were much 
more conservative, less driven by a political and social agenda, and 
primarily interested in profit.
11
 This latter group of Independents 
sought not a world of open interconnection but rather one in which 
they emerged as the new monopolists.
12
 They stridently opposed 
government regulations mandating interconnection.
13
 Indeed, in most 
things, their values were not so different from Bell’s. In addition, these 
two groups’ attitudes toward the Bell System diverged widely. The 
more commercially oriented Independents’ desire to destroy and 
replace Bell brooked no compromise.
14
 The rural cooperatives, in 
contrast, were simply interested in bringing service to their areas as 
quickly and cheaply as possible. As a result, they were much more 
willing to compromise with Bell and were even willing to enter into 
direct competition with other Independents.
15
 
Wu does a service in calling attention to the rural cooperatives, 
which have long been deemphasized by histories of the Independent 
telephone industry. It would be a mistake, however, to replace an 
exclusive focus on one subgroup of Independents with an exclusive 
focus on the other. Although some would engage in a search for which 
of these constituencies represented the true Independents, the data 
suggest that the Independent movement enjoyed its greatest success 
where both wings offered their political support.
16
 Although this more 
complex perspective does not fit as smoothly with Wu’s narrative, it 
does provide a more nuanced appreciation for the dynamics of 
innovation and industrial change. 
                                                                                                                      
 10 See Robert MacDougall, The People’s Telephone: The Political Culture of Independent 
Telephony, 1894–1913, 1 Bus & Econ Hist On-Line 4–5 (2003), online at http://www.thebhc.org 
/publications/BEHonline/2003/MacDougall.pdf (visited Jun 2, 2011). 
 11 See id at 5–6, 10. 
 12 See Gabel, 34 L & Contemp Probs at 354 (cited in note 9) (“The successful competitor 
strives to become the surviving monopolist.”). 
 13 See Mueller, Universal Service at 10, 51, 78–79 (cited in note 7); Bornholz and Evans, 
Early History of Competition at 26–27 (cited in note 9); Gabel, 34 Law & Contemp Probs  
at 353–54 (cited in note 9). 
 14 See Mueller, Universal Service at 78–79 (cited in note 7). 
 15 See id at 69. 
 16 See MacDougall, 1 Bus & Econ Hist On-Line at 5, 8 (cited in note 10). 
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The bigger question is what caused this burgeoning Independent 
movement to fade and allowed the industry to collapse back into 
monopoly. In accordance with a long historical tradition,
17
 Wu suggests 
that the Independents were undone by their inability to create their 
own long-haul long-distance network (p 53). Historians have begun to 
question this explanation, however. In sharp contrast to telegraphy, the 
vast majority of telephone traffic was local.
18
 The long-distance traffic 
that existed tended to travel no more than fifty to one-hundred miles.
19
 
In such a world, long-haul long-distance was “of little commercial or 
social importance.”
20
 Moreover, with respect to short-haul long distance, 
Bell and the Independents employed the same technology, so neither 
side had a cost or quality advantage.
21
 What mattered was not the total 
number of telephone subscribers nationwide or the ability to contact 
distant money centers, but rather the density of connections within a 
particular city or at most within a region.
22
 For example, residents of 
Muncie, Indiana, who subscribed to Bell could call Chicago, New York, 
or Boston. Or they could instead subscribe to the Independent, which 
would allow them to reach neighboring cities located some ten and 
twenty miles away.
23
 The Independents’ regional dominance in the 
                                                                                                                      
 17 See John V. Langdale, The Growth of Long-Distance Telephony in the Bell System: 1876–1907, 
4 J Hist Geo 145, 155 (1978). See also Weiman and Levin, 102 J Pol Econ at 115–17 (cited in note 7). 
 18 See MacDougall, 1 Bus & Econ Hist On-Line at 13 & n 46 (cited in note 10) (reporting 
statements by two Independents that 97 percent and 98 percent of all telephone calls were local). 
 19 See Mueller, Universal Service at 72–73 & n 50 (cited in note 7) (reporting an AT&T 
graph showing that 98 percent of all calls from cities and 95 percent of calls from small towns 
were placed to points located within fifty miles); MacDougall, 1 Bus & Econ Hist On-Line at 13 
n 46 (cited in note 10) (reporting a statement by an Independent that 98 percent of all long-
distance calls were placed to points within an one-hundred mile radius). See also Smith v Illinois 
Bell Telephone Co, 282 US 133, 147 (1930) (reporting that interstate calls constituted less than 
0.5 percent of all telephone traffic); Hearings on S 6 before the Committee on Interstate 
Commerce, Commission on Communications, 71st Cong, 2d Sess 1565, 1585–86 (1930) 
(statement of Joseph B. Eastman, Commissioner, Interstate Commerce Commission) (reporting 
that interstate traffic represented 0.47 percent of all exchange calls and 0.46 percent of total 
exchange revenue and that if exchange and toll calls were combined, intrastate traffic 
represented 1.36 percent of all calls and 9.9 percent of revenue); MacDougall, 1 Bus & Econ Hist 
On-Line at 12–13 (cited in note 10). 
 20 Mueller, Universal Service at 73 (cite in note 7). 
 21 See id at 72. 
 22 See id at 59, 72; Bornholz and Evans, Early History of Competition at 28 (cited in 
note 9). Were dominance a function of national subscribership, the Independents could have 
nullified whatever advantage the Bell System may have enjoyed by forming a network of equal 
size simply by agreeing to interconnect with one another. Roger G. Noll and Bruce M. Owen, 
The Anticompetitive Uses of Regulation: United States v. AT&T, in John E. Kwoka Jr and 
Lawrence J. White, eds, The Antitrust Revolution 290, 292 (Scott, Foresman 1989). 
 23 See MacDougall, 1 Bus & Econ Hist On-Line at 11–12 (cited in note 10) (quoting the 
president of Cleveland’s independent Cuyahoga Telephone Company as saying, “The Cuyahoga 
has the near long distance points, the Bell [has] the far-off”). 
2011] Are Those Who Ignore History Doomed to Repeat It? 1633 
Midwest meant that in those areas they and not Bell enjoyed the 
strategic benefits of being the incumbent. 
Wu offers an alternative explanation, attributing industry 
reconsolidation to the corporate depredations of AT&T President 
Theodore Vail, backed by the financial power of J.P. Morgan. These 
moguls abandoned the Bell System’s initial policy of trying to drive 
the Independents out of business and instead simply merged into a 
monopoly by offering to buy the Independents out (pp 49–50, 52).
24
 
According to this account, the antitrust authorities offered only token 
opposition, allowing the modest concessions embodied in the 1913 
Kingsbury Commitment to justify permitting the Bell System to keep 
its recently acquired companies (pp 55–56). Wu regards the Kingsbury 
Commitment as sanctioning monopoly, with the ultimate coup de 
grâce coming with the enactment of the Willis-Graham Act
25
 in 1921 
(p 59). Other commentators have similarly criticized the antitrust 
authorities for interpreting the Kingsbury Commitment to permit the 
Bell System to continue to acquire Independent telephone companies 
so long as it sold an equivalent number of lines to an Independent.
26
 
The only silver lining to the Kingsbury Commitment, according to Wu, 
was Vail’s acceptance of common-carriage regulation (p 57), and even 
that claim appears to be suspect.
27
 
If true, this would represent a pattern somewhat consistent with 
the Cycle. A close review of the historical record reveals that, contrary 
to what some scholars suggest, the Bell System had not yet come close 
to reestablishing a monopoly at the time of the Kingsbury 
                                                                                                                      
 24 See AT&T, Annual Report 21 (1910) (“Wherever it could be legally done, and done with 
the acquiescence of the public, opposition companies have been acquired and merged into the 
Bell System.”). 
 25 42 Stat 27, repealed by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-104 
§ 601(b)(2), 110 Stat 56, 143. 
 26 See, for example, Gerald W. Brock, The Telecommunications Industry 155–56 (Harvard 
1981); Jeffrey E. Cohen, The Politics of Telecommunications Regulation: The States and the 
Divestiture of AT&T 48 (M.E. Sharpe 1992); Mueller, Universal Service at 134 (cited in note 7). 
 27 A general common-carriage obligation would typically involve regulating retail rates 
and the duty to serve all retail subscribers. The Kingsbury Commitment, however, did not 
address retail service in any way. Instead of focusing on retail subscribers, the Kingsbury 
Commitment provided the Independents access to the Bell System’s long-distance network. 
Moreover, the Commitment was not reciprocal: promising to allow the Independent companies’ 
subscribers to contact Bell System subscribers through the Bell long-distance network did not 
obligate the Bell System to provide its subscribers with access to Independent telephone 
companies’ customers in return. Mueller, Universal Service at 132 (cited in note 7). These 
considerations make it hard to portray the Kingsbury Commitment as the type of mandatory 
interconnection that represents the core of Wu’s policy recommendations. To the extent that 
common carriage was forthcoming, it was from the newly formed state public-utility 
commissions who had jurisdiction over local telephone service and not federal antitrust 
authorities whose purview was limited to interstate commerce. See id at 132–35. 
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Commitment; indeed, Independents still controlled 45 percent of the 
national market.
28
 The issue, then, is not the status of the Bell System 
at the time of the Kingsbury Commitment but rather what happened 
afterwards. Again, the historical record is more complex than 
generally known. Although many scholars evaluating the Kingsbury 
Commitment’s efficacy have focused on whether the number of 
Independent lines acquired from Bell exceeded the number of Bell 
lines acquired by the Independents,
29
 a more telling measure might be 
the Commitment’s impact on the absolute number of lines that Bell 
purchased from the Independents. As shown in Figure 1, the number 
of total Bell acquisitions plummeted after 1913, suggesting that the 
Kingsbury Commitment was not as toothless in curbing further Bell 
takeovers of Independent telephone systems as some would suggest. 
It was not until 1917 that the pattern of acquisitions would resume, 
which was when the de facto requirement that the Bell System sell as 
many lines as it acquired discussed above actually emerged. 
FIGURE 1.  TELEPHONE LINES ACQUIRED BY THE BELL SYSTEM, 
1912–1921 
 
Source: Federal Communications Commission, 3 Report on Control of Telephone Communications: 
Control of Independent Telephone Companies 42 table v (June 15, 1937). 
                                                                                                                      
 28 See US Census Bureau, Historical Statistics part 2 at 783 table R 1–12 (cited in note 9) 
(indicating that the Independents still controlled 4.288 million of 9.543 million total telephone lines). 
 29 See Richard H.K. Vietor, Contrived Competition: Regulation and Deregulation in 
America 172 (Belknap 1994); Gabel, 34 L & Contemp Probs at 353 (cited in note 9). 
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The true determinant of Bell’s reacquisition of its monopoly 
position was thus not the failure of the Kingsbury Commitment in 
1913 but rather a change in the way the Commitment was enforced 
after 1916. In this regard, the historical account presented in the book 
misses two key factors: the assent of the Independent telephone 
industry and the intercession of the federal government. 
Consider first the role of the Independent telephone industry. 
The historical record reveals a dynamic that is much more complex 
and interesting than the simple hegemony of a corporate giant. The 
period of aggressive Bell acquisitions between 1907 and 1913 
produced a storm of complaints by the Independents, which were 
received favorably by the antitrust authorities.
30
 By 1915, however, the 
nature of competition began to shift as the market neared saturation. 
Instead of racing for customers that did not yet have service, the 
Independents had to compete head-to-head for customers already 
served by Bell. Major portions of the Independent telephone industry 
had little stomach for such a bruising battle and began searching 
instead for ways to consolidate with the Bell System.
31
 It was only at 
this point that the Independents conceived of modifying the 
Kingsbury Commitment to permit the Bell System to acquire 
Independent telephone companies so long as it disgorged an 
equivalent number of lines.
32
 Thus, between 1913 and 1916, opposition 
by the Independent telephone industry was enough to thwart 
Theodore Vail’s imperial aspirations. It was only in 1917, after the 
Independent telephone companies began supporting the endeavor, 
that reconsolidation was permitted to occur.
33
 
The other key factor was the federal government. What is often 
overlooked is that for a brief span running from August 1, 1918, to 
August 1, 1919, the US government took over the telephone system 
and placed it under the supervision of Postmaster General Albert 
Burleson. The story is too long to tell here in detail, and the forces 
driving the move were complex.
34
 For now, it suffices to note that one 
                                                                                                                      
 30 See Kenneth N. Bickers, The Politics of Regulatory Design: Telecommunications 
Regulation in Historical and Theoretical Perspective *113–14, 120–21 (unpublished PhD 
dissertation, University of Wisconsin–Madison, 1988) (on file at University of Wisconsin–
Madison); Gabel, 34 Law & Contemp Probs at 352 (cited in note 9). 
 31 See Bickers, The Politics of Regulatory Design at *123–24 (cited in note 30). Indeed, the 
heterogeneity of the Independent telephone companies left them vulnerable to divide-and-
conquer strategies. Mueller, Universal Service at 112 (cited in note 7); Bornholz and Evans, Early 
History of Competition at 28 (cited in note 9). 
 32 See Bickers, The Politics of Regulatory Design at *125 (cited in note 30). 
 33 See id at *126–27. 
 34 The decision was influenced by the fact that Britain had recently nationalized its 
telephone system, the US government had recently taken over the railroad system, and 
Postmaster General Albert Burleson had been a longtime advocate of government ownership of 
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of Burleson’s central commitments was to run the telephone system 
like the postal system—that is, on a unified basis. The day after taking 
control, Burleson issued an order making clear that the purpose of 
government control of the telephone system was “to coordinate and 
unify these services so that they may be operated as a national 
system.”
35
 Six days later, he issued another bulletin noting that 
“[g]overnmental operation and control of the telephone systems of the 
country would undoubtedly cause the coordination and consolidation 
of competing systems wherever possible.”
36
 To encourage the 
unification of the service, Burleson indicated that 
“negotiations . . . already under way for the consolidation of a number 
of competing telephone systems at the time the Government assumed 
control . . . should be continued.”
37
 Where such negotiations had not 
yet begun, Burleson made clear that he had “no objection to the 
companies taking up such negotiations.”
38
 
Another bulletin followed eight days later ordering companies 
“[t]o proceed as expeditiously as possible with the plans heretofore 
instituted for consolidating and unifying the telephone plants and 
properties.”
39
 In areas where such plans were not yet underway, 
consolidation plans “should be formulated as soon as practicable” 
wherever consolidation “is manifestly desired by the public” and “can 
be effected on fair terms and in accordance with law.”
40
 Where two 
competing operators continued to operate, Burleson ordered them to 
“cooperate in making extensions and betterments” in order to 
promote “unification and the elimination of waste.”
41
 On the same day, 
Burleson issued another order creating the Committee on Solicitation 
of Telephone Systems, consisting of AT&T Vice President Nathan C. 
Kingsbury and the president of one of the Independents, “for the 
purpose of making the necessary investigations, conducting 
negotiations, and arriving at agreements for the unification and 
consolidation of the various telephone companies operating in the 
                                                                                                                      
the telephone system. For a more complete account, see Christopher S. Yoo and Michael Janson, 
The Federal Takeover of the U.S. Telephone System During World War I *Part II (unpublished 
manuscript, 2011) (on file with authors). 
 35 US Post Office, Bulletin No 2: Assuming Possession and Control (Aug 1, 1918), in 
Government Control and Operation of Telegraph, Telephone, and Marine Cable Systems, August 1, 
1918 to July 31, 1919 62, 62 (GPO 1921). 
 36 US Post Office, Bulletin No 3: Consolidation of Competing Telephone Systems (Aug 7, 
1918), in Government Control 62, 62 (cited in note 35). 
 37 Id at 63. 
 38 Id. 
 39 US Post Office, Bulletin No 4: Extensions and Betterments Curtailed (Aug 15, 1918), in 
Government Control 63, 63 (cited in note 35). 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
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same community.”
42
 The report issued after the end of the takeover 
noted with great pride the postmaster general’s support for 
“consolidations for the purpose of getting rid of pernicious 
competition and wasteful operation” and his approval of thirty-four 
consolidations of competing telephone operations during this period.
43
 
The reconsolidation of the telephone industry was thus as much 
the product of the accession of the Independent telephone industry 
and the policies of the federal government as the industrial 
machinations of Theodore Vail. Indeed, the post office could unify the 
system far more decisively and quickly than the Bell System ever 
could. Any attempt to fit this historical episode back into the Cycle by 
suggesting that the Bell System was the moving force behind the 
government takeover is belied by the fact that everyone expected that 
Burleson’s first order of business was to fire Vail and that Vail evaded 
the sack only by promising to do whatever the postmaster general 
wanted.
44
 
The flowering of the Independent telephone companies and the 
eventual retrenchment of the industry in the hands of AT&T thus 
represent an imperfect fit with Wu’s Cycle. Instead of a new 
technological environment opened by a group of people committed to 
openness and closed by the actions of a corporate mogul, we find a 
situation in which both the forces challenging the incumbent and the 
means through which the incumbent was able to reassert its 
dominance to be much more complex. Analysis of these complexities 
promises to yield a richer sense of the interactions between 
innovation, commercial interests, and government actors obscured by 
attempts to make this episode conform to some predetermined 
pattern. 
B. The Breakup of AT&T 
The event marking the second turn of the Cycle in the telephone 
industry is the breakup of AT&T (pp 194–95). On a superficial level, 
splitting the Bell System into a long-distance company (AT&T), seven 
local telephone companies (Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, BellSouth, 
NYNEX, Pacific Telesis, SBC, and US West), and an equipment 
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company (Lucent Technologies) would appear a likely candidate for a 
return to openness. 
On closer inspection, however, the parallels between these 
episodes become less clear. As an initial matter, the type of openness 
implicated by the breakup of AT&T is very different from the type of 
openness at issue during the era of Independent telephony. Openness 
during that period was the direct result of the emergence of direct 
competition in local telephone service (p 48). Thus, the type of 
interconnection at issue was fundamentally horizontal. 
The judicial proceedings ordering the breakup of AT&T, in 
contrast, abandoned all hope of inducing direct competition between 
multiple local telephone service providers.
45
 Instead, the breakup was 
designed to promote competition in complementary services, such as 
long-distance, customer-premises equipment, and data-processing 
services (the last of which were direct precursors to the modern 
Internet) (pp 189–91). Providers of these complementary services did 
not want to replace AT&T’s local telephone network and provide 
services instead of AT&T. They wanted to access AT&T’s local 
telephone network so they could provide services in addition to those 
provided by AT&T. In short, they sought to offer complements to the 
local telephone network, not substitutes. The type of interconnection 
these firms sought was thus not horizontal but rather vertical. Wu’s 
other work recognizes that horizontal and vertical interconnection 
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Telecommunications Law §§ 7.5.2–7.5.3 at 626–32 (Aspen 2d ed 1999). 
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raise very different concerns,
46
 but he glosses over this key distinction 
when treating the Independent telephone era and the breakup of 
AT&T as part of the same Cycle. As a general matter, horizontal 
practices raise significantly greater economic concern than vertical 
ones. In addition, horizontal and vertical remedies are targeted toward 
very different policy outcomes. The former is designed to break up a 
monopoly. The latter intends to leave the monopoly in place and 
simply insist that it be shared. 
The differences between horizontal and vertical relationships 
make it difficult to regard the first two historical episodes in the 
telephone industry as being of a piece. Another difficulty arises from 
the mechanism through which the market opened. In the case of 
Independent telephony, the market opened through competitive entry. 
In the case of the breakup of AT&T, Wu sees the government as the 
key driver, led by the White House (p 187), backed by the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) (pp 188–91), and finished by the 
antitrust courts (p 193). Given the Reagan administration’s emphasis 
on deregulation and competitive markets, Wu suggests that the 
government must have regarded AT&T’s efforts to preserve its 
monopoly as “blasphemy” (p 193). 
Again, a broader look at the history yields a story with more 
interesting twists and turns. The atmosphere surrounding monopoly 
and deregulation was quite complex. On the one hand, deregulation 
enjoyed widespread intellectual and political support, perhaps best 
demonstrated by the deregulation of the airline industry during the 
Carter administration in 1978 under the leadership of Senator Ted 
Kennedy and Stephen Breyer, who was then serving as chief counsel 
to the Senate Judiciary Committee. On the other hand, the decision to 
proceed with the breakup of AT&T must be viewed side by side with 
the Reagan administration’s other signature antitrust policy decision: 
the termination of the longstanding case against IBM. The fact that 
the administration reached different opinions in the IBM case and the 
AT&T case suggests it was applying a nuanced, context-sensitive 
vision of competition policy rather than mechanically pursing an 
ideology.
47
 
Equally interesting is the inconsistency of the government’s 
support for openness. Although the FCC would eventually support 
liberalizing markets for long-distance services and customer-premises 
equipment, it initially refused to do so and instead sided with AT&T, 
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until the courts overturned its decisions and forced it to reverse 
course.
48
 As discussed below, this episode is more properly regarded as 
supporting Wu’s ambivalence about whether government is part of the 
problem or part of the solution rather than as an example where the 
government played a positive role in helping open a technology.
49
 
C. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the Merger  
Wave of the 2000s 
The final turn of the Cycle in the telephone industry begins with 
the enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
50
 and ends with 
SBC’s acquisition of AT&T in 2007 (pp 243–44, 252). The dynamics of 
this episode are particularly complex. Wu’s argument is that the 
telecommunications industry hid behind the ideology of deregulation 
to push through a statute that effectively insulated it from antitrust 
scrutiny and then used litigation to render the implementation of that 
statute a nullity. At the same time, they used mergers to reconstruct the 
Bell System despite the lack of meaningful competition (pp 242–48). 
History has shown the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to be a 
deeply flawed piece of legislation, although the specific critique 
offered differs from person to person.
51
 The statute’s flaws are evident 
in the fact that the crown jewel was supposed to be the restoration of 
local telephone companies’ ability to offer long-distance service. As it 
turns out, by 1996 long distance had begun to become so competitive 
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that rates dropped to no more than a few pennies per minute.
52
 In fact, 
wireless providers do not even charge more for long-distance calls, 
instead simply treating long-distance minutes the same as local 
minutes.
53
 They typically do not allow subscribers to choose their own 
long-distance provider, and yet given that wireless long distance is 
essentially free, consumers are left with little room to complain about 
the lack of choice. Moreover, the extent to which the 1996 Act 
exempted telephone companies from antitrust scrutiny is easily 
overstated. Although the disputes over access rates are now largely 
exempt from regulatory scrutiny, notwithstanding the Act, the mergers 
that are the focus of Wu’s concern still had to pass review by the 
antitrust authorities and the FCC.
54
 
On a more fundamental level, attempts to draw parallels between 
the structure of the modern telecommunications industry and the 
industry structure that preceded the breakup of the Bell System are a 
bit disingenuous. The new AT&T bears little resemblance to the old 
AT&T. Prior to the breakup, AT&T had essentially a nationwide 
reach and controlled over 80 percent of the market.
55
 The new AT&T 
faces a far different reality. As an initial matter, AT&T can only offer 
local telephone service in roughly half the country. Moreover, it now 
faces vigorous competition from other telephone providers. The 
number of wireless telephone subscribers reached over 277 million by 
the end of 2008, more than double the number of total wireline 
subscribers.
56
 Moreover, in the first half of 2009, an estimated 
21 percent of adults relied exclusively on their wireless phones for 
voice service.
57
 Approximately 29 million households now rely on 
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) provided by cable companies and 
other Internet providers to provide voice services, which represents 
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nearly 20 percent of the market and is continuing to grow.
58
 In 
addition, WiFi hotspots and other wireless LAN services have become 
important bases for voice communications.
59
 In the Internet era, 
moreover, people communicate in more diverse ways than by making 
phone calls. Although it was once common to think of data as an 
application riding on a voice network, voice is now more properly 
regarded as an application riding over a data network. Indeed, in a 
world increasingly dominated by text messaging, young mobile phone 
users typically do not use the voice feature of their phones at all.
60
 
The result is that the number of telephone lines provided by 
incumbents has been in steep decline, dropping from a high of 
193 million in December 2000
61
 to a low of 122 million as of June 
2010.
62
 Indeed, many incumbents are looking for opportunities to exit 
the telephone business altogether, as demonstrated by Verizon’s 
recent sale of a number of rural telephone systems to Frontier.
63
 
Indeed, concerns about AT&T’s supposedly dominant position in 
telephony seems singularly misplaced when scholars are saying that 
cable is the new natural monopoly with which other technologies 
cannot hope to compete.
64
 
Most importantly, the mechanism supposedly used to close the 
industry during this turn of the Cycle is much more elaborate than 
mere aggrandizement by an industry mogul. The scheme discussed 
requires a high degree of sophistication, involving the co-option of the 
legislative process, strategic use of regulation, and the ability to 
convince antitrust authorities to sanction anticompetitive mergers. 
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Such a theory requires a good deal more analytical structure on how 
incumbents can use a variety of government processes to close 
markets than the simple, mogul-driven vision Wu originally proposed. 
While this scenario is certainly plausible, significantly more analysis is 
required before it becomes more than just an amorphous concern. 
* * * 
The examples drawn from the telephone industry are 
considerably more complex than the simple exposition of the Cycle 
would lead one to believe. Instead, a closer examination of the 
historical context reveals rich and multifaceted dynamics surrounding 
the nature of the parties, the particular vision of openness being 
pursued, the role of the government, and the specific mechanisms by 
which an industry transforms from open to closed and back. As is so 
often the case, real-world examples resist being reduced into simple 
stories. Although a more detailed exploration of the history of the 
telephone industry would not fit so easily into the simple narrative Wu 
advances, it would have yielded greater insight into forces that shape 
and reshape the way technologically driven industries evolve. 
II.  RADIO AND TELEVISION 
The second major industry that Wu examines is broadcasting. His 
narrative begins with the early days of radio and the emergence of 
television and culminates with the advent of cable television. 
Although each example exhibits some of the features of Wu’s Cycle, 
each deviates from the pattern in important ways that invite further 
analysis. 
A. Radio 
Wu’s narrative on the history of radio centers on David Sarnoff, 
the president of the Radio Company of America (RCA) and its 
wholly owned subsidiary, the National Broadcasting Company (NBC). 
The first turn of the Cycle occurred when Sarnoff and RCA took the 
open technology that was early radio (p 39) and subdued it by the 
mid-1930s (p 84). Faced with the fact that AT&T’s long-distance 
network provided “the only practical means of moving sound around 
the nation” (p 76), Sarnoff used patent litigation to induce AT&T to 
abandon radio altogether (pp 79–81). In addition, Sarnoff protected 
RCA’s legacy AM radio business by preventing FM, which first 
emerged in the 1930s, from becoming an important medium until the 
1970s (pp 133, 135). 
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Told in this way, the story of radio fits Wu’s great-man account of 
a media mogul who crushes the opposition. Yet the account of 
Sarnoff-as-monopolist works only if one overlooks the fact that NBC 
faced serious competition throughout its existence. Beginning in the 
mid-1920s, first Arthur Judson and then William Paley built the 
Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) into a serious rival to NBC. In 
this case, CBS was able to use government pressure to force AT&T to 
open its long-distance lines to networks other than NBC.
65
 Yet CBS 
appears only a few times in Wu’s narrative, usually in passing as part 
of a budding duopoly (pp 83, 132, 139). There is no exploration of how 
CBS managed to survive, let alone thrive. And while CBS makes a 
brief appearance, the Mutual Broadcasting System (MBS), which 
represented the other major rival to NBC,
66
 is completely missing. 
Sarnoff’s control over radio was thus far from airtight, which makes 
this episode an uncomfortable fit with Wu’s Cycle. 
B. Broadcast Television 
Wu’s history of the introduction of television in the US also 
revolves around Sarnoff, and it may provide the best example of the 
Cycle. But the smoothness of Wu’s account, like his history of radio, is 
achieved by deemphasizing certain aspects of the historical record. Wu 
begins with a familiar history of the invention of television, focusing 
on the struggles of three inventors—John Logie Blair, Charles Francis 
Jenkins, and Philo T. Farnsworth—to bring their devices to market in 
the 1920s and 1930s (pp 136–37, 139–42, 148–51). 
At first, television appeared to be the perfect Schumpeterian 
disruptive technology, poised to replace radio (p 135). But television 
took two decades to reach a mass market, a fact that incenses Wu. He 
holds radio mogul David Sarnoff primarily responsible, framing the 
story as a clash between naïve inventors and a rapacious capitalist. As 
the head of RCA, Sarnoff used all of his influence to retard and 
control the adoption of the new medium. Sarnoff, Wu suggests, did not 
want to kill radio’s new competition. He was experienced enough to 
see that television was an unstoppable force, possibly even an 
opportunity (p 139). Rather than futilely trying to eliminate the new 
medium, Sarnoff did everything that he could to ensure that when 
television eventually reached the US market, it would do so as an 
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extension of his “empire of the air,” as Lee de Forest called it.
67
 To 
achieve his victory and control the new medium, Sarnoff publicly 
disparaged television as an “experimental” technology, and he 
successfully coaxed the FCC to label it as such (pp 138–46). 
Wu inveighs against the FCC’s efforts to block the introduction 
of television, and he invokes Friedrich Hayek to ask, “How can 
government possibly have enough information to know when 
something as unpredictable as a technology is ‘ready?’ . . . [S]ome 
measure of regulation by the government was, of course, to be 
expected. But even this fact cannot justify a total freeze on 
commercial television lasting two decades” (p 145). In contrast to his 
condemnation of the FCC, Wu yearns for the open period of 
“permissionless innovation” that existed briefly when Herbert Hoover 
gave out ad hoc radio licenses as the secretary of commerce (p 145). 
As alternatives to the US’s lack of action, Wu points to launches 
of television in Germany and England in the 1930s, and he speculates 
about the television innovation that might have been had Sarnoff and 
the FCC not intervened (pp 147–48). Instead of a vibrant television 
industry in the 1920s, however, America saw Sarnoff reveal RCA’s 
plans to introduce television at the 1939 World’s Fair in Queens, 
erasing the decades of inventors and inventions that had come before 
(pp 151–53). In this particular incarnation of the Cycle, Sarnoff-as-
Kronos successfully ate his children and lived on as his own successor 
(or something like that). Farnsworth had some small revenge when he 
forced RCA to pay a licensing fee to use his television patent, but by 
then Sarnoff had effectively taken control (p 153). And even so, Wu 
acknowledges that television never enjoyed the amateur, 
noncommercial phase typically associated with his conception of the 
Cycle (p 154). 
This is the neatest and one of the most compelling stories in the 
book. Indeed, master storytellers Aaron Sorkin and Ken Burns have 
told this story themselves in other works.
68
 But it is also a story that 
overlooks some important history in order to paint an emotional 
picture of personal battles. It also tends to overread current issues 
back into history. (For example, the phrase “permissionless 
innovation” that Wu uses to talk about early television actually comes 
from Vint Cerf, as Wu acknowledges (p 145).) What Wu fails to 
mention in his reveries about the lost possibilities for TV in the 1930s 
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is that television had very limited success as a commercial medium in 
Europe before the Second World War. In Germany, the Nazis feared 
that television in homes might lead to private mockery of Hitler.
69
 In 
Britain, only 20,000 television sets were sold before the outbreak of 
World War II.
70
 It is possible that without opposition from Sarnoff and 
the FCC, television technology would have found a successful market 
in the US. But it is also possible that the capital, infrastructure, and 
cultural acceptance might have lagged, as they did in Europe. 
Wu’s great-man theory of history erases the complex and 
fascinating process of innovation and diffusion. Blair, Jenkins, 
Farnsworth, and Sarnoff are all clearly central figures in the 
development of television. Innovation, however, requires technology, 
capital, and culture to come together. Moreover, the television 
inventors did not come out of nowhere. They built on the many 
inventors who experimented with cathode ray tubes both privately 
and under the auspices of large companies like Bell Labs and Western 
Electric. The economic effects of the Great Depression and World 
War II are also important elements to the story to which Wu alludes 
only briefly (pp 146, 147, 154). Stories of great men make for great 
dramas, but they also require a belief in social vacuums that do not 
really exist. 
C. Cable Television 
The history of cable television bears some of the trappings of 
Wu’s usual view of the Cycle. The industry’s early days bore witness to 
advocates driven by idealistic motives, such as Ralph Lee Smith, Fred 
Friendly, and the Sloan Foundation (pp 176–77, 181–83). In other ways, 
however, cable industry was quite different. Two figures in particular 
receive credit for promoting an industry that challenged the big three 
television networks. 
The first is President Richard Nixon, who supported the key 
regulatory decisions that made cable possible (pp 177, 184–85). 
Although Wu does not credit him explicitly, Nixon even pioneered the 
term “separations policy” (p 184) that would become in name and 
substance the core of Wu’s policy recommendation. As Wu notes, 
Nixon’s motives were far from above reproach, given that his desire to 
promote cable was driven by a desire to retaliate against the broadcast 
television networks that were causing him so much grief (p 185). 
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Despite this, Nixon remains one of the seminal figures in promoting 
the cable industry. 
The second is Ted Turner, who Wu regards as a mogul cut from 
the same cloth as Theodore Vail (p 208). Unlike the typical moguls in 
Wu’s Cycle, who use the corporate clout of a dominant incumbent to 
force industries to close, Turner was an outsider who pushed the 
industry toward openness. This proves once again how a close analysis 
of actual facts can reveal dynamics that are far more interesting than 
simple parables. 
* * * 
In short, each of these three episodes deviates from Wu’s vision 
of the Cycle in important ways. With respect to radio, Sarnoff’s efforts 
to leverage NBC’s market must be viewed in light of the fierce 
competition it continued to face from CBS and MBS. Wu’s account of 
the stillborn early days of broadcast television does not grapple with 
the role played by the Depression and World War II, and even then he 
candidly acknowledges that it did not enjoy the usual initial period of 
openness typically associated with the Cycle. With respect to cable, 
primary credit for ushering in a new era of openness in the television 
industry goes to a US President and the type of mogul usually 
associated with closedness, although one who began his career as an 
industry outsider. Unfortunately, the bases for these variations in the 
patterns and the insights from examining the interactions of a more 
complex set of forces remain unexplored. 
III.  MOTION PICTURES 
Wu tells four stories about the American film industry. He starts 
with an account of the fall of the first American film oligopoly, the 
Motion Picture Patents Company, also known as the Edison Trust. He 
then turns to the coercive distribution practices of the early Hollywood 
studios. In the third film chapter, Wu considers the workings and impact 
of the motion picture “Production Code” that studios adopted in the 
1930s to sanitize film content. And in a final chapter on film since the 
1960s, Wu examines the methods media conglomerates have developed 
to manage risk in the uncertain business of making blockbuster movies. 
These are some of the major turning points in the development of the 
American film industry, and in Wu’s hands, they offer lessons in how 
centralized control of cultural industries have limited free expression 
and shaped the marketplace of ideas. 
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In his study of the American film industry, Wu eschews the 
economic and industrially focused film scholarship that has flourished 
since the 1970s.
71
 Instead, he relies on the autobiographies of film 
moguls, and he revives the work of some of the earliest film historians, 
like experimental filmmaker Lewis Jacobs, Hollywood producer-
director Benjamin Hampton, and (surprisingly) the French neo-
Fascists Maurice Bardèche and Robert Brasillach. This fuels Wu’s 
great-man perspective on history, and we get a picture of the film 
industry through the eyes of its once and would-be oligarchs. This 
approach allows Wu to tell a lively story of intense personalities and 
representative moments in the history of the American film industry. 
It also suggests indirectly that the evil that must somehow be checked 
is individual ambition and not necessarily media consolidation itself. 
A. The Edison Trust versus the Independents 
In the chapter on the early film industry, Wu recounts the 
standoff between the Edison Trust and the group of independent 
companies that challenged it. This is a bit of a divergence from his 
investigation of other industries, which all start with narratives about 
the openness that accompanies new inventions. And, indeed, the 
history of the film industry that preceded the Edison Trust would have 
been a perfect illustration of the Cycle that Wu posits. Film technology 
emerged simultaneously in the United States and many countries in 
Western Europe.
72
 The technologies varied widely, and so did the 
businesses that grew up to exploit them. Edison developed peep show 
movie houses, called kinetoscope parlors, for audiences to view short 
films individually, like they listened to phonographs in Edison’s 
successful phonograph parlors. Other inventors built on the model of 
vaudeville or magic-lantern slide shows, developing projectors to 
display films to large audiences. These new devices required content 
and exhibition spaces, and many small companies arose to make films 
or set up small nickelodeons. Some of the early film exhibitors like 
Samuel Goldwyn and Adolf Zukor went on to become important 
moguls, but many more were pushed out of business by the rise of the 
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Edison Trust.
73
 The pre-Trust years are a great example of the 
openness that Wu sees at the start of new industries and longs to have 
preserved. It is curious that he does not spend more than a few 
sentences on it. 
The Edison Trust was formed in 1909 when the Edison 
Manufacturing Company, the Eastman Company, and other leading 
film equipment manufacturers, producers, distributors, and theater 
owners pooled their patents and cut licensing deals in an attempt to 
corner the entire American film market. The Trust succeeded briefly, 
but their extortive pricing, litigiousness, and failure to innovate led a 
group of independent film producers and exhibitors to effectuate a 
successful coup only a few years into the Trust’s reign. Trust members 
put their energy into crushing the competition through aggressive 
business tactics and lawsuits, with the Trust suing one leader of 
the Independents, Carl Laemmle, 289 times over a three-year period 
(p 68). But while the Trust members focused on gaining complete 
control of the industry, the Independents focused on content. They 
pioneered the use of film stars, and they standardized feature-length 
films (pp 61–63). At the time, the film industry was growing to meet 
the interests of the middle-class audience that was drawn to feature 
films, a form that better lent itself to the pacing of legitimate theater 
and novels. They were also drawn to the glamour of stars, especially 
when they came from the stage, like Sarah Bernhardt (p 62). The Trust 
members became so invested in their calcifying business model that 
they missed the importance of these changes. Indeed, they fought 
against them: Who wanted to pay actors more money once they 
achieved star status? 
As he does throughout the book, Wu points to the cultural 
implications of the kind of consolidation that the Trust achieved. “In 
an information industry,” he writes incisively, “the cost of monopoly 
must not be measured in dollars alone” (p 69). During the brief reign 
of the Trust, creative innovation among Trust members came to a halt; 
we know this because innovation continued outside the system, in the 
sphere of the Independents. Wu characterizes the Trust’s tactics as 
representing “an essential tension between free expression and 
intellectual property” (p 68). And he explains the inevitable failure of 
such a tight-fisted choke hold on the market.  
While condemning the Trust, Wu celebrates the Independents’ 
flight to the West Coast, and he describes Los Angeles as a den of 
freedom for “industry outlaws on the lam” (p 68). As even Wu 
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intimates, this is a romantic notion of the early LA film industry. Film 
production in LA predates the formation of the Trust, and there were 
many rational reasons for film companies to relocate from Fort Lee, 
New Jersey—the first American movie capital—to LA. Perhaps the 
primary reasons were the weather and terrain. In the years before 
roughly 1914, when Klieg lights made indoor shooting feasible,
74
 the 
warm Southern California weather and long days permitted many 
more hours of shooting a year than the filmmakers could get back 
east. And the coastline, desert, and mountains near LA have 
continued to provide great backdrops for stories set in seemingly far-
off locales.
75
 
Even if the Independents were not the free-spirited pirates Wu 
paints them to be, they did successfully challenge the Trust. First, they 
surpassed the Trust aesthetically, and then they supported the 
government’s efforts to break up the cartel in a federal district court 
in 1915.
76
 The Trust thus lasted only six years, a period of time more 
consistent with the tumult of an emerging industry than with the 
innovation- and creativity-killing dynamics associated with the Cycle. 
Moreover, Wu claims that, following the victory, “[t]he American film 
industry was, for the first time, an open industry” (p 72). But was it? 
The Independents hastened the downfall of one oligopoly, the Edison 
Trust, but, as we will see in the next section, they replaced it with 
another. 
B. The Birth of Hollywood 
The closed system controlled by the Edison Trust was followed 
immediately by another closed system. The Independents of the early 
1910s, men (and they were all men) like Adolph Zukor, Carl 
Laemmle, William Fox, and William W. Hodkinson, quickly emerged 
as the leaders of film studios like Universal, Paramount, and 
Twentieth-Century Fox—the studios, that is, that formed the new 
oligopoly that we have come to call Hollywood. And with some 
reshuffling, it is that oligopoly that remains in control of the 
entertainment industry today. Wu’s second story of the film industry 
addresses the swift closing of the newly opened industry. He explains 
how film mogul Adolph Zukor and some of his underlings at 
Paramount studios introduced a new centralized distribution system 
to the recently opened circuit of movie theaters. Where the Trust had 
relied on exclusive contracts with its theater owners, Zukor used the 
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power of his star actors and high-profile Broadway adaptations to 
impose oppressive terms on the exhibitors. Zukor dictated that if the 
exhibitors wanted a new Mary Pickford film, they would have to buy 
the entire year’s run of Paramount films as a single block. Not only 
would they have to buy the entire block, but they would have to do it 
“blind”—that is, sight unseen (pp 86–87, 93–97). 
“Was block booking really such a bad thing?” Wu wonders in this 
chapter (p 95). As a matter of pure economics, Wu concedes the 
answer may well be no. Many industries have turned to bulk sales to 
accommodate the scale of large industries, and Wu concedes that the 
scholarly defenses of the practice offered by Nobel prize-winning 
Chicago School scholar George Stigler and UCLA antitrust expert 
Benjamin Klein “might be right” (p 96).
77
 Wu nonetheless argues that 
two other concerns justify judicial hostility toward block booking. 
First, by simultaneously adopting block-booking regimes during the 
1920s, 1930s, and 1940s, the market leaders effectively kept their 
competition out of the market. The studios did not explicitly collude, 
but they did simultaneously work to freeze competitors out through 
practices that Wu calls “parallel exclusion” (p 97). Second, industries 
that peddle expression are different. In the sphere of cultural 
production, the combination of block booking and oligopolistic 
structure severely limited the range of voices that could get to the 
movie-going audience, both in the US and abroad, where the 
Hollywood studios controlled most markets. 
Both of these claims are quite contestable. Although some 
antitrust scholars have long argued that parallel behavior in an 
oligopolistic industry creates the same harm as collusion,
78
 courts and 
other antitrust scholars have generally rejected such arguments based 
on the difficulty of fashioning a remedy that requires a firm to deviate 
from the rate of output that is individually rational.
79
 Second, as 
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discussed below, there is a long scholarly tradition showing that 
bundling content from the same provider can actually cause the 
quantity and variety of media programming to increase.
80
 
The film industry became fully vertically integrated, according to 
Wu, in 1926, a year he calls “the turning point for American film” 
(p 97). In that year, Zukor took over the large midwestern theater 
chain of Balaban and Katz, solidifying his control over more than a 
thousand US theaters. And the following year, Zukor and the other 
studio heads successfully fought a Federal Trade Commission 
investigation into their monopolistic practices. Wu chalks the latter 
victory up to personal influence; through film industry lobbying, 
Hollywood moguls convinced President Calvin Coolidge to appoint a 
sympathetic Abram Myers to head the Commission. Myers proved 
relatively lenient, although the studios fought even his minor 
reprimand. And for Wu this is the end of the story. “The rise of 
Hollywood and the Zukor model,” he writes, “is another definitive 
closing turn of the Cycle” (p 98). 
But we might also see the 1927 clash with the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) as the beginning rather than the end of the Cycle. 
For the next twenty years, the US government would remain in a 
continuous negotiation with the Hollywood studios over their 
vertically integrated structure. The Department of Justice continued 
an on-again, off-again investigation of Hollywood’s block-booking 
practices, and the threat of an antitrust action kept the studios in close 
relationships with the presidential administrations that followed.
81
 
During the Depression, Franklin Delano Roosevelt declared motion 
pictures to be an essential industry, allowing them temporarily to defer 
an antitrust investigation.
82
 Then, during World War II, Hollywood 
further deferred an antitrust investigation by working for the war 
effort.
83
 Only after World War II, in 1948, did the government finally 
conclude its case against Hollywood, forcing them to divest 
themselves of the theater chains they had acquired.
84
 
C. The Hollywood Production Code 
While the centrally controlled studio system created by Zukor 
and other moguls was good for business, Wu argues, it made 
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Hollywood vulnerable in another way: it made the industry more 
susceptible to content control. When a few individuals held the reins 
of the entire industry, it made it much easier for religious 
organizations to exert pressure over the bottleneck of control. “In 
fact,” Wu speculates, “had Zukor and his cohorts at Warner Bros., 
Universal, and Fox not wiped out the independent producers, 
distributors, and theaters, the rule of the Production Code would not 
even have been possible” (p 119). 
In his third chapter on the film industry, titled “The Legion of 
Decency,” Wu recounts how Hollywood came to implement the 
Production Code. Wu’s history of the Production Code weaves 
together an institutional analysis with personal narratives, as he 
explains how Hollywood came to censor itself during the 1930s. He 
tells the story of the Catholic Legion of Decency’s threats, led by 
Father Daniel Lord, to boycott films, and he focuses on the underlying 
anti-Semitism that drove many of the reformers who sought to impose 
new standards of decency on Hollywood. Following Thomas 
Dougherty’s seminal biography of top Production Code administrator 
Joseph Breen, Wu relates Breen’s personal vendettas against the 
studio moguls. 
These biographical accounts are placed in the context of an 
industrial analysis. “[I]n the United States,” Wu writes, “it is industrial 
structure that determines the limits of free speech” (p 121). Congress 
is prevented from abridging freedom of speech, but industries and 
individuals may find ways of internally regulating what can be said. 
And that is exactly what happened when Hollywood succumbed to 
pressure from religious organizations (among other pressures) and 
agreed to an internal system of prior restraint. Starting with a 1927 
agreement, the “Don’t and Be Carefuls,” studios began to submit story 
ideas, scripts, and rough cuts of films to the Motion Picture Producers 
and Distributors Association for review and approval, resulting in 
what Wu calls “perhaps the strictest abridgement of speech in US 
history” (p 124). 
A few moguls tamed by powerful social reformers is certainly one 
way of reading the history of the Production Code. But over the last 
thirty years or so, film industry scholars have come to see it as 
something else. As early as 1909, the Edison Trust agreed to submit 
films to a review body called the National Board of Censorship (later 
the National Board of Review), and all Trust films had to carry the 
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board’s seal of approval.
85
 This system certainly helped appease critics 
who worried that film was spreading vice and immorality. But the seal 
also helped to consolidate the Trust’s hold on the industry. Not only 
did they control every stage of production and distribution, they now 
had control over content as well. And the seal was one more element 
binding theater owners to the exclusive display of Trust member films. 
Similarly, the Production Code was a corporate document. Far 
from an imposition on the studios, moguls actually had reasons to 
embrace the code. For one, it helped regularize Hollywood’s product. 
Like stars and genres, the regulations of the code brought some 
stability to the most volatile aspect of the filmmaking process: 
storytelling. With the code, the studios instituted a system with explicit 
storytelling conventions. Both writers and audiences came to 
understand the rules of Hollywood exposition, and the product 
became much more reliable. Moreover, the code created a language 
for talking about sex, crime, and politics. If explicit scenes of passion 
were limited, for example, filmmakers could still develop a new 
language of ambiguous symbolic cues (panning to a fireplace or 
smoking a cigarette) that audiences learned to understand (or ignore 
if they so chose).
86
 And finally, it is important to note, the Production 
Code Administration did not always oppose the studios. It also helped 
them. There may not have been federal censorship of movies, but in 
1916, the Supreme Court declared film to be “a business pure and 
simple,”
87
 denying First Amendment protection and opening the door 
for state and local censorship. In addition, many countries had 
national censorship bodies. One function of the Production Code 
Administration was to ensure that films flowed freely across state and 
national borders.  In the case of the films such as Little Caesar and All 
Quiet on the Western Front, for example, the Production Code 
Administration staff went to state censor boards to make the case for 
having the films shown despite their depictions of violence.
88
 
The Production Code did place limits on the market for ideas, as 
Wu argues. But these were limits that Hollywood leaders found 
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valuable, even desirable. Content regulation did not curb Zukor’s 
business; it helped ensure its stability. 
D. Conglomeration and Blockbusters 
Even with the Production Code in place, however, filmmaking 
has always remained a risky business, and in Wu’s fourth chapter on 
the film industry, titled “Mass Production of the Sprit,” he addresses 
Hollywood’s transformation from an entertainment industry into part 
of a series of diversified conglomerates. In search of the changing 
economic model of the film industry, Wu traces the history of two 
bombs, Michael Camino’s 1980 flop Heaven’s Gate and the 2007 Steve 
Carell vehicle Evan Almighty (pp 217–18, 236–37). Heaven’s Gate was 
the indulgent Gesamtkunstwerk that took down a studio, United 
Artists (p 218). Evan Almighty was merely a loss on a Universal 
Studios balance sheet (p 237). What happened between the two flops? 
Why did one have dire consequences while the other barely 
registered? What happened in the intervening twenty-seven years? 
According to Wu, it is the rise of the multinational, diversified 
conglomerate. 
Starting in the late 1960s, all of the studios either became part of a 
conglomerate or they grew into multimedia communication companies 
on their own. Paramount was acquired by Gulf + Western; Disney 
eventually acquired radio stations, comic book publishers, and a TV 
network. The effect of this conglomeration, Wu tells us, was to bring an 
end to “the second open age of film” (p 218). Wu does not explain what 
he means by the second open age of film, but we can assume that he is 
referring to the rise of independent and semi-independent companies in 
the 1960s and 1970s, companies like BBS Productions, which made Easy 
Rider and started the television rock group The Monkees. 
As he does in earlier chapters, Wu tells this story through the lens 
of individuals. In this case he focuses primarily on executive Steve 
Ross. Ross took a family conglomerate that included parking garages 
and funeral homes and built a media empire around Warner Bros. Wu 
might have chosen other corporate titans through which to tell this 
story; Gulf + Western CEO Charles Bluhdorn, who took over 
Paramount in 1966, is a candidate who would have yielded a very 
different picture. Bluhdorn ruled Paramount from a distance, putting 
his trust in people who knew the industry like Bob Evans and Peter 
Bart. But Ross is a great example of the kind of business leader that 
interests Wu. A conglomerate, as Wu colorfully defines it, “is a hydra-
headed creature whose operations and advantages have mystified 
lawyers and economists alike” (p 219). If conglomerates do not make 
rational sense, much of the motivation for amassing media empires 
can be attributed, Wu argues, to “purely personal motivations, indeed 
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vanities” (p 225). Ross, for example, was known for bestowing lavish 
corporate gifts on his clients and throwing company funds at 
overindulged pet projects. 
The takeover of Hollywood by conglomerates, however, did 
change the running of the industry. Wu describes Ross as “the first 
pure businessman” (p 222), as opposed to a theater owner or 
producer, who hit it big in Hollywood. (We might quibble and suggest 
that Joseph Kennedy held that title sixty years earlier.)
89
 And as a 
result, Ross brought a new risk-management system to the industry. 
Wu lists two new practices in particular. First, under Ross and the 
conglomerates, Hollywood began to rely much more heavily on 
making films based on existing products, like successful books or 
cartoon characters. The film industry used to refer to these films as 
“presold.” Second, film studios focused more on distribution and less 
on production. They began to “mine festivals” (pp 232–33) for talent 
and products, rather than having to take early risks on careers or 
ideas. By the time Universal made Evan Almighty, studio economics 
had changed. The days of the moguls making films gave way to 
businessmen offsetting risky endeavors with tested strategies. Through 
television and DVD sales, even flops like Evan Almighty could 
recover some of their losses. 
This example looks very different from Wu’s other explorations 
of Hollywood history. When writing about the Edison Trust, block 
booking, and the Production Code, we get a picture of consolidation 
limiting access to the market. But conglomerates’ takeover of studios 
also leads to the industry’s absorption of the Independents who 
challenged it. Companies like BBS were acquired by the studios, as all 
successful independent production companies have been since. And 
the practice of acquiring and distributing festival films also introduced 
more diversity into the market. If anything, in Wu’s account, the 
introduction of conglomerates opened the system to include more 
voices rather than pushing them out. 
E. It’s the Content, Stupid 
The Master Switch does not attempt to offer a complete history of 
the American film. As he does throughout the book, Wu focuses on a 
few important nodal moments in the development of the industry in 
order to distill key lessons for media industries. But Wu’s account of 
the film business is very different from his account of other industries. 
Here, technological change does not loom very large. He does not 
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focus on how the coming of sound, color, home video, or digital 
cinema challenged the closed order of the industry. There is no Kronos 
effect in his history of Hollywood, although that might have been a 
fascinating investigation. Instead, Wu seems to pick moments when 
consolidation and content clash. The Independents defeated the Trust 
by introducing stars and feature films. Block booking pushes 
competitors out of the market. Consolidation also makes it possible 
for religious groups to impose prior restraints on the industry through 
the Production Code. And the conglomerates’ takeover of studios 
leads to safer business practices, like relying on hits that have been 
proven in other media. If there is a lesson in these chapters, it is, as he 
tells us in his account of block booking, that content and not just 
economics must be considered when regulating and evaluating the 
structure of cultural industries and its impact on diversity. Wu, 
however, does not give us any clues about how to go about measuring 
the cultural value of film output. 
IV.  PERSONAL COMPUTERS AND THE INTERNET 
As with the other historical episodes appearing in the book, The 
Master Switch’s history of the personal computer industry and the 
Internet presents a wealth of interesting stories and personal 
narratives, with the internal conflicts within Apple Computer taking 
center stage. While the intramural battle between the “Two Steves” is 
both fascinating and important, this dynamic should not overshadow 
other aspects and actors that played a key role in shaping the personal 
computer industry during its early days. 
A. Early Kit Computers 
In 1962, the New York Times published an interview with 
electronic computing pioneer Dr. John Mauchly, one of the inventors 
of both the ENIAC (arguably the world’s first functional electronic 
digital computer) and the UNIVAC (the first commercially available 
computer produced in the United States).
90
 The focus of the interview 
was a yet-to-be-developed technology that Mauchly referred to 
alternatively as a “pocket computer” and a “personal computer.”
91
 
Recent advances in miniaturized electronics made the development of 
such devices “inevitable,” Mauchly argued, and the imminent 
availability of such small, portable, and, above all, affordable 
computers would bring the power of electronic computing, heretofore 
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the exclusive province of governments and corporations, into the lives 
of the ordinary individual. Within a decade or so, Mauchly predicted, 
“everyone would have his own computer” and would mobilize that 
computing power for purposes previously unimaginable. For example, 
a housewife equipped with one of these “pocket computers” could use 
it not only to maintain her household inventory but also to order 
goods electronically. “Taking her computer from her handbag,” she 
could connect it directly to a communications kiosk at her local 
grocery store. Once the store’s computer network had verified her 
identify and authorized the charge against her “universal checking 
account,” everything she needed for the coming week would be 
determined automatically, packaged, and made immediately available 
for pickup or delivery.
92
 
Mauchly’s vision of the empowering potential of the “pocket 
computer” seems to us today remarkably prescient, encompassing 
elements of both the personal computer and the Internet. But 
Mauchly was not alone, even in the early 1960s, in imagining the 
revolutionary potential of a truly personal computer. The very first 
popular treatment of electronic computers, Edmund Berkeley’s 1948 
Giant Brains; or, Machines That Think, had described a relatively 
simple home computer (called “Simon”) that could be built for about 
$500, and by 1955 Berkeley was selling via mail his “Geniac Electronic 
Brain Construction Kit,” which allowed hobbyists to build a series of 
thirty “electronic brains.”
93
 Over the course of the 1960s, several 
companies, including Heathkit, were marketing do-it-yourself home 
computer kits. Some of these, such as the 1967 CT-650 (the so-called 
“paperclip computer”) were probably too simplistic to be much use to 
anyone; others, such as the 1965 Honeywell Model 316 Kitchen 
Computer, available for purchase from the Neiman Marcus catalog, 
was perhaps a little too far ahead of its time: although the Model 316 
was surprisingly sophisticated (it shipped, fully assembled and 
functional, with an unheard of 4 kB of RAM), it also cost $10,600. 
By the middle of the 1970s, there were multiple microcomputer 
systems available for purchase in the United States, including both 
relatively inexpensive machines such as the Kenbak I ($750) as well as 
high-end equipment like the Hewlett-Packard 9380A ($5,075), which 
shipped not only with a version of the BASIC programming language 
but also, for an additional $5,870, a 2.5 MB hard drive.
94
 By 1975, even 
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the stodgy old IBM Corporation had developed a portable desktop 
computer, the IBM 5100, which included a screen, a tape drive, and a 
keyboard—all packaged in a handy suitcase-like carrying case.
95
 That 
same year witnessed the launch of Byte magazine, one of several new 
publications devoted to the burgeoning microcomputer industry.
96
 For 
the most part, this was an industry that catered either to existing 
computer users (in this period, mostly businesses) or amateur 
enthusiasts. Nevertheless, it is clear that by the early 1970s, at least, 
that Mauchly’s imagined “personal computer” was well on its way to 
becoming a reality. 
B. The Altair 8800, the Apple II, and the Two Steves 
The existence of such early examples of commercially available 
microcomputers challenges conventional narratives about the 
“invention” of the modern personal computer. Most popular histories 
of computing are dominated by just two moments of invention: the 
MITS Altair 8800 (1975) and the Apple II (1977). The Altair 8800 is 
often represented as the first “real” microcomputer, and the Apple II 
as the first commercially viable “home computer.”
97
 The mythology 
surrounding these two machines—and the small but select group of 
celebrity inventors and entrepreneurs most associated with their 
development—has so eclipsed all other innovations as to make them 
effectively invisible.
98
 But while both machines are important (albeit 
not necessarily for the reasons typically given in the conventional 
narratives), it is misleading to use them as guides to the overall 
development of an entire industry. 
The Altair 8800 was one of the more successful of the early 
microcomputer kits (although, as we have seen, by no means the first) 
and was influential in that it helped establish one of the first standard 
industry architectures (the S-100 bus). More importantly, it was the 
machine that first attracted the attention of Harvard sophomore Bill 
Gates and his boyhood friend Paul Allen.
99
 In what has become one of 
the best-known and most defining success stories of the modern era, 
the mere existence of the Altair 8800 so inspired Gates and Allen that 
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the former quit school and the latter his job, and both moved to 
Albuquerque to found a company called Micro-Soft (as their 
company was then called). The company’s first product was a version 
of the BASIC computer language written specifically for the Altair.
100
 
The rest, as they say, is history. 
The Apple II, as the name implies, was the second version of a 
computer developed by another pair of boyhood friends, the 
legendary Two Steves: Steve Wozniak and Steve Jobs. In 1976 the Two 
Steves, along with another friend, Ronald Wayne, started a company 
to sell a microcomputer kit developed by Wozniak.
101
 Within another 
year, the company had incorporated, attracted venture capital, and 
launched the Apple II, a well-designed, consumer friendly 
microcomputer.
102
 Although Apple Computer was actually only one of 
several firms marketing mass-market microcomputers in this period, it 
was by far the most visible, and Wozniak and Jobs quickly emerged as 
the symbol not only of a new kind of company—the high-tech 
personal computer start-up firm—but also of a new kind of computing 
culture: hip, empowering, and open (pp 273–74). In the conventional 
mythology, Jobs provided the countercultural credibility and charisma, 
“the Woz” the technical expertise. 
Wu relies on this mythology to illustrate the shift from openness to 
control in the personal computer industry. According to his account, it 
was the Apple II computer, and the Apple II exclusively, that came to 
define the meaning of the modern personal computer and its 
subsequent implications for society. As he tells the story, in its early 
years, Apple Computer was the “original revolutionary, the 
protocountercultural firm that pioneered personal computing” (p 270). 
What made Apple different, according to Wu, was Steve Wozniak’s 
commitment to radical openness, to the personal computer as “a benefit 
to humanity—a tool that would lead to social justice” (p 275). In Wu’s 
interpretation, Wozniak embedded these values into the design of the 
personal computer, forever establishing openness as the true essence of 
the spirit of personal computing. Unlike the machines of its competitors, 
the Apple II was built with an “open architecture,” which meant that 
users were encouraged to open it up and “tinker with the innards, to 
soup it up, make it faster, add features, whatever” (p 276). Whereas its 
competitors were simply building computers, Apple was “the first 
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company to bring open computing, then merely an ideological 
commitment, to mass production and popular use” (p 270). 
But just as an apple brought down the original paradise, so too 
did this Apple contain the seeds of its own destruction. Where Steve 
Wozniak was committed to openness, his partner Steve Jobs was 
obsessed with aesthetic purity. Where Woz’s Apple II was designed to 
be open and expandable, Jobs’s Macintosh was closed and controlled. 
Although innovative in certain respects (particularly its incorporation 
of the graphical user interface and the “mouse” pointing device), the 
Macintosh was, according to Wu, also “completely retrograde” (p 277). 
In choosing elegant design over user accessibility, Jobs had “elected 
the design principles that had governed the Hollywood Studios, 
Theodore Vail’s AT&T, indeed anyone who had ever dreamed of a 
perfect system” (p 277). In Wu’s parable of the Two Steves, the 
essential nature of the personal computer (open, organic, user-
friendly) is corrupted by the cold beauty of the closed, impersonal 
system. As Steve Jobs assumed more and more control of Apple 
Computer, he would “repudiate, decisively and forever,” Steve 
Wozniak’s original vision of personal empowerment through 
technology (p 291). With the introduction of the iPod, iPhone, and 
iPad, Jobs completed his usurpation of the potential of the personal 
computer. These devices, according to Wu, constituted the culmination 
of Jobs’s desire for “perfect control over product and consumer” 
(p 291). While they might at first appear to be user-friendly, they are in 
fact designed specifically to be “Hollywood-friendly.” With obvious 
approval, Wu repeats the dire prediction of Tom Conlon, a columnist 
at Popular Science: “Once we replace the personal computer with a 
closed-platform device such as the iPad, we replace freedom, choice 
and the free market with oppression, censorship and monopoly” 
(p 293). A more perfect encapsulation of Wu’s larger cyclical model of 
history can hardly be imagined. 
The primary source for Wu’s pocket history of the personal 
computer is Wozniak’s own recent memoir, iWoz.
103
 But while personal 
recollections make for interesting reading, they are rarely reliable 
historical sources. In order to fit his model to the relevant history, Wu 
has to be carefully selective. Missing is the long prehistory of the 
personal computer, from Mauchly’s original coinage through the early 
microcomputers of the mid-to-late 1960s to the early attempts to 
commercialize the technology in the 1970s. Almost completely ignored 
are Apple’s competitors, many of whom had market shares almost as 
large as Apple’s, even in Apple’s heyday of the late 1970s and early 
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1980s. Microsoft and IBM appear only, and curiously, as the spiritual 
successors to Wozniak’s ideal of openness. No mention is made at all of 
many of the other great contributors to the history of the personal 
computer, many of whose goals and agendas do not fit neatly into Wu’s 
simplistic open-versus-closed dichotomy. Even the history of Apple 
itself is curiously truncated: We know (perhaps) what cofounders Steve 
Jobs and Steve Wozniak believed in what they were doing, but what 
about Apple president and CEO Michael Scott, or key investors such as 
the former Intel executive Mike Markkula (who would soon become 
Apple’s second CEO) or venture capitalist Arthur Rock—not to 
mention the other Apple engineers, marketing executives, sales 
specialists, and users? To what degree were they willing to compromise 
openness for usability or simplicity or some other virtue? 
How would the historical picture look if we incorporated a richer, 
more nuanced, more diverse set of perspectives? To begin with, it 
might be difficult to define who exactly “invented” the personal 
computer. Was it Berkeley or Mauchly, who both at least imagined its 
existence? Or the early microcomputer kit manufacturers who built 
actual, working machinery? Or does the claim to have truly invented a 
product require that the product possess a certain level of 
sophistication? These questions matter not so much in terms of 
establishing priority (like almost every significant technological 
innovation, the personal computer is the product of many 
contributors, and so fine-grained distinctions about who was first are 
seldom productive or interesting) but rather in that they complicate 
any interpretation of the “essential character” of any given technology. 
There were amateur enthusiasts, like Steve Wozniak, for whom the 
personal computer was more a toy with which to tinker than a tool for 
accomplishing some other activity. But there were also others whose 
interest was always primarily commercial.
104
 Some aspects of the early 
microcomputer systems were open; others were closed. In fact, it 
might be argued that it is the unresolved tension between the two that 
proves most productive for the industry: the technology had to be 
open enough to encourage peripheral innovation but closed enough to 
allow for consistency, control, and profitability. 
The case of the Altair 8800 is illuminative in this respect. The Altair 
was not the first, the least expensive, or the most powerful of the 
microcomputer kits available in the mid-1970s. Like many of these build-
it-yourself kits, it was built around the Intel 8080 microprocessor, which 
was designed for and marketed specifically to microcomputer 
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manufacturers. From the point of view of these manufacturers, the Intel 
8080 was a commodity technology: combined with a set of related control 
chips (also provided, and heavily marketed, by Intel), almost any 
company with expertise in electronics could assemble a microcomputer 
kit.
105
 In this sense, the Intel architecture was open. The only unique 
contribution of MITS, the manufacturer of the Altair, was the S-100 bus, 
which provided expansion slots into which other peripheral devices could 
be easily inserted. The S-100 bus became one of the first industry 
standard architectures, representing yet another degree of openness.
106
 
This openness was not ideological, but rather practical. In order to put 
together its kit quickly and inexpensively, MITS had to build in the ability 
for future upgrades. In its stock configuration, the Altair 8800 could not 
actually do very much.
107
 Getting it to do anything interesting required 
memory upgrades, peripheral devices such as screens and keyboards, and 
software applications. The S-100 bus allowed the Altair 8800 to be 
expandable.
108
 The extent to which it also made the Altair architecture 
“open” was entirely unintentional and, from the point of view of MITS at 
least, undesirable. Like many innovators who designed architectures 
which were a little too open, MITS was soon forced out of the market it 
had helped create by competitors leveraging the widespread availability 
of peripherals designed for the S-100 bus and software developed for the 
Intel 8080 microprocessor. The only long-term survivor of the cutthroat 
competition created by the S-100 clones was the one company who 
aggressively protected as proprietary its contribution to the otherwise 
open ecosystem: in a now legendary “open letter” to computer hobbyists, 
Microsoft cofounder Bill Gates famously decried the deplorable 
tendency among hobbyists to share their software.
109
 While the Altair 
BASIC language that Microsoft developed was “open” in the sense that 
it could be used to create and expand the overall system, it was itself 
closed off to the public. 
The ready availability of sophisticated microprocessors like the 
Intel 8080, Motorola 6800, and MOS Technologies 6502 created the 
conditions for rapid expansion within the microcomputer industry in 
the mid-to-late 1970s. That these were the products of large, 
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traditional, and often defense-oriented firms is generally omitted from 
the conventional hippy- and hacker-focused origins stories of the 
personal computer. Within a few years, dozens (if not hundreds) of 
microcomputer companies had emerged to capitalize on this emerging 
market. Of these, Apple was arguably the most visible, although Tandy 
Radio Shack and Commodore International were comparable in 
terms of both technology and market share.
110
 It is not at all clear that 
it was the Apple II that primarily defined for the public what a 
personal computer was and should be, much less that “openness” was 
a computer’s most important feature. The Commodore 64, introduced 
in 1982, remains the best selling computer of all time. More than 
seventeen million were sold worldwide.
111
 And yet the Commodore 64 
was not an open architecture machine.
112
 
Even the Apple II was only “open” in limited ways. Like the 
Altair 8800, it was designed with expansion slots to encourage 
peripheral development.
113
 This was a common design strategy for 
computer manufacturers: the goal was to encourage network effects 
and to establish your platform as the key element of an overall 
technology ecosystem. Those elements of the system that Apple 
wanted and needed to control, such as the Apple system software, it 
kept proprietary. In 1982, for example, it sued the Franklin Computer 
Company, which had created an Apple II clone, for copyright 
infringement.
114
 It is not clear that Apple was ever open in the sense 
that Wu and Wozniak imply; it was certainly not open in the modern 
usage established by the open source software movement. 
C. IBM as the Paragon of Openness 
In any case, the one computer manufacturer that might plausibly 
claim to have firmly established the personal computer industry was not 
Apple, Tandy Radio Shack, or Commodore, but rather the IBM 
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Corporation. What IBM did for the personal computer industry was to 
establish a single, industry-wide architecture. Some elements of this 
architecture were open, others aggressively closed. What is important is 
not whether it was open or closed but simply that it was standard. And 
to a certain extent, all standards are closed. They limit certain kinds of 
innovation and enable others. Within a few years of its introduction, the 
IBM-Microsoft-Intel architecture killed off almost all of its competitors 
(pp 278–79). In doing so, it allowed software developers and peripheral 
manufacturers to focus all their attention on a single dominant 
ecosystem. The result was an explosion of investment and innovation in 
the personal computer industry. Within unity, diversity. 
Wu acknowledges the role of the IBM-Microsoft-Intel architecture 
in bringing about a mass-market revolution in personal computing, but 
his characterization of this architecture as being “open” is inconsistent. 
It is true that IBM constructed its early personal computers around 
widely available components, such as the Intel 8086 microprocessor. In 
fact, this decision helped contribute to IBM’s eventual downfall as a 
personal computer manufacturer, as other manufacturers could also 
easily purchase identical equipment.
115
 But one key element of the IBM 
system, the Microsoft Disk Operating System (MS DOS), did remain 
tightly controlled. True, it remained controlled by Microsoft, not IBM, 
but controlled nonetheless. Microsoft gladly licensed their system to 
IBM clone manufacturers, which ultimately made IBM irrelevant.
116
 But 
there was nothing open about the Microsoft operating system. Once 
again, we see that elements of the system can be made open while 
others remain proprietary. These are not primarily ideological positions; 
they are commercial strategies. It is true that in certain technologies, in 
specific historical periods, the balance between open and closed can 
become upset. It is not at all obvious, however, that the history of either 
the personal computer or the Internet illustrates a clear or inevitable 
trajectory from open to closed. The reality is much more complicated. 
The point of all this is not to quibble over historical details. Such 
disputes are generally of interest only to specialist historians, industry 
insiders, and patent lawyers. But when historical case studies are used 
to develop sweeping arguments about important social issues and 
policy concerns, it is important that we get the facts straight. There are, 
astonishingly, almost no rigorous historical treatments of the personal 
computer industry. The literature is so dominated by the wonderfully 
compelling life stories of fabulously rich computing celebrities that it 
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is difficult for more staid, academic histories to compete. More 
significantly, it is clear from the solid histories that do exist that the 
true story of the personal computer revolution is exceedingly 
complicated and involves a wide range of actors, including not just 
inventors but manufacturers, marketers, developers, users, educators, 
and content providers as well. There is more to this story than just 
Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak. 
D. AOL–Time Warner 
Of all the stories that Wu recounts, the one that is the hardest to 
fit into his narrative is the epic failure of the AOL–Time Warner 
merger, which he candidly terms “A Surprising Wreck” (p 257). At the 
time, many observers thought of the combination of the largest dial-up 
Internet service provider (ISP) (which was also the leading provider 
of proprietary content) with a firm that represented the second-largest 
cable operator (which was also the largest broadband ISP and the 
holder of a vast film library) as something akin to the end of history. 
As it turned out, it was simply the end of approximately $200 billion in 
Time Warner shareholder value. 
So what derailed this would-be juggernaut combination of content 
and conduit? Although Wu acknowledges the problems caused by the 
clash of corporate cultures, he assigns primary responsibility to the 
irrepressible force of the Internet (pp 260, 265–66, 268). Once end users 
were freed to serve as their own guides in finding content, the walled 
garden that AOL tried to preserve did not stand a chance. 
Somewhat strangely, Wu takes little comfort from this story, 
rejecting the exceptionalist position that the Internet is inherently 
different (pp 5, 14, 317). Indeed, he harbors great concern that some 
corporate interest will attempt and succeed where AOL failed (pp 7, 
14, 285–86, 290, 296, 317–18). And yet, these concerns remain quite 
amorphous without any clear explanation of why Wu thinks that a 
later effort might be more successful in altering the Internet’s open 
architecture than was AOL’s.  
Another plausible explanation is that AOL and the entire dial-up 
ISP model were undone not by openness but rather by the Internet’s 
shift from narrowband transmission via dial-up modems to broadband 
transmission. In the narrowband world, in which end users employ 
telephone connections to dial into modem banks maintained by ISPs, 
the network serves as a mere passthrough. Indeed, the network is 
oblivious to whether the connection is carrying a voice call, a fax, or 
data communications. All of this changed with the deployment of 
broadband connections, such as Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) and 
cable modem systems. Because these systems use the same wire to 
carry two different streams (video combined with data in the case of 
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cable modem systems and voice combined with data in the case of 
DSL), both types of providers must maintain equipment in their 
central facilities to separate the streams as well as a data network 
within the facility to hold the traffic emerging from the data 
connection until it can be routed toward its ultimate destination. Thus 
a broadband network provider no longer serves as a mere 
passthrough. Instead, it must necessarily perform a number of 
functions previously provided by ISPs. When that is the case, the 
incremental cost to establish a direct connection to a backbone access 
point is trivial, and it makes little sense for the network provider to 
rely on an ISP for services that a broadband network can provide 
more cheaply itself.
117
 
AOL was thus undone not by the Internet’s architecture but 
rather by the technological collapse of the interface on which the dial-
up ISP business model was based. Interestingly, since Time Warner 
was the largest broadband network provider at the time, AOL might 
have been able to survive had it converted itself into the homepage 
for Time Warner’s portal services. Ironically, as Wu notes, it was 
prevented from displacing the incumbent proprietary portal service 
(known as Road Runner) by merger conditions imposed by the 
Federal Trade Commission (p 265). 
* * * 
In short, framing the computer industry in terms of an intramural 
dispute within Apple does not fairly capture the relevant history. Not 
only does it overstate the extent to which the Apple II was in fact open, 
it also exaggerates the importance of the Apple by ignoring the wide 
range of other early microcomputers, many of which were far more 
successful than the Apple II and which reveal a vibrant market-based 
competition between open and closed strategies. Furthermore, 
architectural outcomes were driven more by technical considerations 
(such as occurred with the Altair 8800) or legal restrictions (as was the 
case with the AOL–Time Warner merger) rather than by a principled 
precommitment to openness. Only by truncating the account of these 
events can the history be made to fit the mogul-driven vision of the 
Cycle that is the central driver of the book. 
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V.  TOWARD A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE FORCES DRIVING 
THE CYCLE 
A more comprehensive account of the histories of the telephone, 
radio, television, film, and computer industries reveals patterns of 
interactions between forces that are much more complex than 
suggested by the more streamlined account presented in The Master 
Switch. Far from being a problem, these variations in the patterns of 
industry evolution are invitations for further analysis that hold 
considerable promise for providing a richer understanding of the 
forces shaping emerging communications technologies. 
A. Different Theoretical Conceptions of the Cycle 
Wu argues that information industries pass through a life cycle 
that transitions from open to closed and eventually back to open, with 
openness and closedness measured largely in terms of vertical 
integration (pp 130, 147, 305–06, 311). As noted earlier, Wu views the 
Cycle as being driven by corporate moguls attempting to reassert 
dominance (p 10). 
This argument fits into a long tradition of theories exploring how 
the degree of vertical integration varies over the course of an 
industry’s life cycle. The best-known theory was offered by Nobel 
laureate George Stigler. Stigler argued that vertical integration in an 
industry follows a “U” shape over time, beginning as vertically 
integrated, transitioning to vertically disintegrated as the industry 
matures, and then returning once again to vertically integrated as the 
industry declines. Because young industries often employ new 
materials and technologies that are typically unavailable on the open 
market, firms operating in these industries must produce all of their 
key inputs themselves. As demand for the product becomes better 
established, production becomes sufficiently large, and risk drops to 
the point where third parties have strong incentives to begin providing 
these inputs. When the industry enters its decline phase, the decline in 
sales volume causes third-party input providers to disappear, and 
firms operating in this industry must once again provide these inputs 
for themselves.
118
 A literature has emerged assessing Stigler’s life cycle 
theory of vertical integration empirically.
119
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Many eminent scholars have identified similar patterns in media 
industries. Ithiel de Sola Pool notes that during the first generation of 
broadcast radio stations, “broadcasters themselves had to take 
responsibility for putting on programs.”
120
 Bruce Owen and Gregory 
Rosston similarly observe that because “[i]ndependent programmers did 
not come forward in sufficient numbers” to meet cable’s burgeoning 
demand for programming, cable operators had to self-finance the initial 
generation of cable programming.
121
 Alfred Kahn has expressed similar 
views.
122
 The history of the cable industry provides a particularly dramatic 
demonstration of this dynamic.
123
 In 1990, 50 percent of all cable networks 
and thirteen of the top fifteen cable networks by viewership (87 percent) 
were vertically integrated.
124
 By 2009, these numbers had dropped 
precipitously, with only 6 percent of all cable networks and two of the top 
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fifteen cable networks by viewership (13 percent) being vertically 
integrated.
125
 Other examples include the fact that Apple relied on its 
proprietary software provider Claris to produce the first generation of 
software for the Macintosh.
126
 Indeed, industries that require the 
simultaneous development of complementary products often rely on a 
single, vertically integrated player to get both sides on board.
127
 
Interestingly, this vision of the typical industry life cycle follows 
the opposite pattern as the one Wu proposes. Even more importantly, 
Stigler’s life cycle is driven by different forces. Instead of hegemonic 
business strategy driven by corporate moguls, Stigler’s version is the 
result of the size of the underlying market. 
Clayton Christensen, who Wu cites favorably to support other 
propositions,
128
 offers a theory of vertical integration that follows a 
similar pattern but for somewhat different reasons. During an industry’s 
early stages, firms compete by offering greater product functionality. At 
that time, the interdependency of production functions, the need to stay 
at the cutting edge of the technological frontier, and the need for 
unstructured technical dialogue leads them to prefer vertically 
integrated firm structures.
129
 Eventually, market leaders push the level of 
product improvement past what customers can utilize, at which point 
the basis for competition shifts to other factors, such as speed to market 
and customization. This represents a different type of competition, 
which favors the more vertically disintegrated structure associated with 
modularity.
130
 After the benefits provided by these alternative 
dimensions have been exhausted, competition once again turns to price, 
                                                                                                                      
 125 See Yoo, Comments of Christopher S. Yoo at 29 figure 10 (cited in note 123). 
 126 Claris Corporation, Presenting Claris 1.0, InfoWorld S8–S9 (Sept 26, 1988) 
(advertisement). 
 127 See Bernard Caillaud and Bruno Jullien, Chicken & Egg: Competition among 
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pay for. See Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause 
Great Firms to Fail xv (Harvard Business 1997). To Christensen, then, disruptive innovation is 
not an attack by a superior technology from above. It is an attack by an inferior technology from 
below. Id at 165. 
 129 See Clayton M. Christensen, Matt Verlinden, and George Westerman, Disruption, 
Disintegration, and the Dissipation of Differentiability, 11 Indust & Corp Change 955, 962–63 (2002). 
 130 See id at 963–64. 
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which refocuses firms on the cost minimization made possible by 
vertical integration.
131
 Under Christensen’s theory, the mechanism 
driving the level of vertical integration is the relative pace of product 
innovation and consumers’ ability to absorb those changes, rather than 
the level of specialization permitted by the size of the market. 
Other technology-focused life cycle theories draw very different 
conclusions.
132
 For example, the “dominant design” theory pioneered by 
William Abernathy and James Utterback posits that when a new 
industry first emerges, the uncertainty surrounding which particular 
configuration of technologies will best serve consumers’ needs 
discourages specialization in production and gives advantages to those 
who keep their production processes flexible.
133
 Once the industry 
coalesces around a dominant design, price competition intensifies, and 
the market becomes stable enough to provide incentives to investing in 
more specialized production processes.
134
 Many scholars assumed that 
the desire for greater control over production processes once a 
dominant design has emerged would lead to greater vertical 
integration.
135
 Later scholars recognized that firms could accomplish the 
same objectives through contracts establishing long-term partnerships 
with suppliers and distributors instead of through formal vertical 
integration.
136
 This pattern would continue until a major change in 
technology, market demand, or government regulation caused the 
market to undergo “dematurity,” at which point the cycle begins once 
again.
137
 Other scholars have refined the analysis still further, suggesting 
that the life cycle is more likely to be restarted by innovations that 
destroy the know-how embodied in the existing technological 
                                                                                                                      
 131 See id at 963 n 7. 
 132 For a survey of life cycle theories and their policy implications for the Internet, see 
Christopher S. Yoo, Product Life Cycle Theory and the Maturation of the Internet, 104 Nw U L 
Rev 641, 666–67 (2010). 
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 135 See James M. Utterback, Mastering the Dynamics of Innovation: How Companies Can 
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and Fernando F. Suárez, Innovation, Competition, and Industry Structure, 22 Rsrch Pol 1, 4 (1993) 
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outcome of technological evolution in an industry”). 
 136 See Utterback and Suárez, 22 Rsrch Pol at 4, 18 (cited in note 135). 
 137 See William J. Abernathy, Kim B. Clark, and Alan M. Kantrow, Industrial Renaissance: 
Producing a Competitive Future for America 21, 109 (Basic Books 1983); William J. Abernathy 
and Kim B. Clark, Innovation: Mapping the Winds of Creative Destruction, 14 Rsrch Pol 3, 18 
(1985); Utterback, Mastering the Dynamics of Innovation at 158–65 (cited in note 135). 
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paradigm
138
 and challenge the linkages between the existing paradigm’s 
core technological concepts.
139
 
In contrast to the models advanced by Stigler and Christensen, the 
overall pattern of vertical integration and renewal associated with 
dominant design theory is more consonant with the Cycle Wu envisions. 
Dominant design theory does differ in one important respect, however. 
The life cycle is driven not by the ambitions of moguls or by corporate 
strategy but rather by the inexorable force of the underlying 
technology. As was the case with Stigler’s theory, the empirical 
literature testing dominant design theory is somewhat mixed.
140
 
Stigler’s model also drew criticism from another Nobel laureate, 
Oliver Williamson, who suggested that vertical integration was more 
the result of opportunistic behavior and transaction costs than sales 
growth.
141
 Consistent with this insight, David Teece developed a theory 
of industry life cycles that combines transaction cost considerations 
with dominant design theory. Most innovations are not stand-alone 
products; instead, they usually must be combined with other inputs in 
order to become marketable to consumers.
142
 During an industry’s 
initial stages, when firms are struggling to identify the optimal product 
design, control of these other inputs does not play a significant role.
143
 
Once the dominant design has emerged, however, the innovator’s 
success turns as much on its bargaining power vis-à-vis the providers 
of these other inputs as it does on the value provided by its own 
contributions. If the innovator has to make relationship-specific 
investments, it will be vulnerable to ex post opportunistic behavior by 
the providers of these other inputs.
144
 The classic solution to this 
problem is to use long-term contracts to enter into a strategic 
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partnership or, if the costs of external contracting and monitoring 
exceed the costs of internal governance, to vertically integrate.
145
 
Thus, transaction-cost theory also supports a pattern of vertical 
integration similar to the one Wu predicts. As was the case with 
dominant design theory, however, the dynamic driving this life cycle 
(minimization of transaction costs) is quite different from the one Wu 
envisions. 
The theoretical literature thus exhibits a wide range of views 
regarding the forces causing the patterns of vertical integration within 
an industry to change over time. Indeed, in the historical episodes that 
Wu describes, key turning points are the result of a variety of factors, 
including the ambitions of industry moguls, patents, antitrust 
enforcement, and intellectual movements, many of which do not fit 
easily into a single conception of the Cycle. Instead, they invite closer 
analysis of how these episodes fit within the theoretical literature, an 
exercise that would help shed light on how market demand, 
technological change, and corporate ambitions can cause industries to 
shift between open and closed structures. Indeed, these differences 
provide the variation needed to evaluate the relative merits of the 
various hypotheses. 
B. The Impact of Advertising and Market Structure on Content 
Another area that receives little exploration is the role of 
advertising. Although the book discusses the radio industry’s early 
opposition and later acceptance of advertising as a primary source of 
revenue (pp 74–77), it does not analyze the structural implications of 
advertising support or the role of advertisers as rivals for control. For 
example, radio networks often sold blocks of time to advertisers, who 
then hired advertising agencies to produce programs for these slots.
146
 
This in effect forced networks to surrender control over their own 
schedules to advertisers, a fact that gave sponsors tremendous control 
over industry behavior. Advertisers thus represented important industry 
players who often served as important counterweights to Sarnoff. 
Reliance on advertising support has several other structural effects.
147
 
For example, it introduces an intermediary into the relationship between 
programmers and viewers. As a result, programming is likely to be 
influenced more by programs’ impact on consumers’ willingness to buy 
                                                                                                                      
 145 See id at 293–94. 
 146 See Barnouw, 1 A History of Broadcasting at 156–59 (cited in note 65). 
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advertised products than by audiences’ desire to see particular 
programming.
148
  
Furthermore, advertising support limits consumers’ ability to signal 
the intensity of their preferences in much the same way as voting regimes. 
As an initial matter, advertising revenue provides only an indirect signal 
of the value that listeners and viewers place on the underlying 
programs.
149
 Moreover, unlike pricing regimes, in which audiences can 
signal particularly strong preferences by paying more for programming, 
advertising support gives consumers only one way to signal the intensity 
of their preferences: viewing versus nonviewing.
150
 As a result, advertising 
responsiveness is generally regarded as understating the value that 
audiences place on those programs.
151
 The result is a reduction in the 
resources invested in program quality. At the same time, reliance on 
advertising support reduces the diversity of programming by increasing 
the break-even audience size that programming needs to survive.
152
 
These insights undercut the sharp distinction that Wu attempts to 
draw between these historical episodes’ impact on industry economics 
and their impact on the nature and quality of the content being 
created (pp 97, 303–05). By affecting the economics, these industry 
practices directly affect the quality and diversity of content being 
conveyed. In short, these practices and the quality and quantity of 
speech are inexorably linked. 
Consider block booking, which Wu notes may be economically 
beneficial (p 96). (This debate remains ongoing, particularly in the 
modern context of allowing cable subscribers to select channels á la 
carte.) Beyond the works that Wu cites, there is a long scholarly 
tradition showing how bundling content from the same provider can 
promote economic welfare,
153
 either by allowing excess consumer 
surplus enjoyed by one consumer with respect to one product to fund 
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any shortfalls in another product
154
 or by discouraging a single firm 
providing many channels from using its additional channels to offer 
content that simply cannibalizes audiences from offerings already on 
the air.
155
 Wu nonetheless claims that despite these potential economic 
efficiencies, block booking remains problematic because of its adverse 
effect on the nature of the content being produced. This argument 
disregards the fact that improving economic efficiency can also have a 
positive effect on the quantity, quality, and diversity of programming. 
Increasing program producers’ ability to appropriate surplus makes it 
easier for new films and programs to cover their costs. This favors 
special interest programs by enabling them to survive despite the fact 
that they draw relatively small audiences.
156
 This insight draws support 
from the fact that a diverse range of cable networks, including C-
SPAN, Discovery, and a number of networks targeted toward African 
Americans, all opposed regulatory efforts to unbundle cable television 
channels.
157
 
Wu also repeats the often-advanced claim that information 
industries are more horizontally concentrated than in the 1950s 
(pp 255–56). This claim ignores the broader literature suggesting that 
this is not true empirically.
158
 Even more importantly, a rich theoretical 
literature exists showing that the relationship between horizontal 
concentration and program diversity is ambiguous.
159
 Some empirical 
studies have indicated that increases in horizontal concentration may 
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 157 See Hazlett, 5 J Telecomm & High Tech L at 281–83 (cited in note 156). 
 158 See Eli M. Noam, Media Ownership and Concentration in America ch 13 (Oxford 2009). 
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actually improve program diversity,
160
 although the FCC found the 
empirical support too ambiguous to support a strong policy inference in 
either direction.
161
 Again, in addition to affecting economic welfare, 
structural features of the underlying industries have implications for the 
nature of the content being created.
162
 The ambiguity of the empirical 
record does not support attributing any simple relationship between 
structure and conduct. 
But Wu reserves his harshest criticism for vertical integration, 
which he claims reduces content diversity and innovation (pp 130, 147, 
295, 305–06, 311) and presumes that an open, vertically disintegrated 
structure will yield better content (pp 35–39, 72–73, 139–47, 297). At 
other times, however, the book concedes that vertical integration may 
actually benefit consumers (pp 84, 162, 284 n *, 305, 306), epitomized 
by the seamless and high-quality end-user experience offered by 
Apple (pp 278, 291–92). Indeed, a vibrant theoretical literature exists 
identifying ways that vertical integration yields efficiencies.
163
 An 
empirical literature is emerging that explores these conclusions.
164
 Yet 
Wu concludes that the “Separations Principle” requires that these 
benefits be sacrificed (p 305). In the process, Wu also stops short of 
undertaking any detailed analysis of the literature exploring the 
impact that prohibiting these practices would have on the nature of 
media programming. The FCC’s experience with how restrictions on 
                                                                                                                      
 160 See Steven Berry and Joel Waldfogel, Do Mergers Increase Product Variety? Evidence 
from Radio Broadcasting, 116 Q J Econ 1009, 1024 (2001); Augustus E. Grant, The Promise 
Fulfilled? An Empirical Analysis of Program Diversity on Television, 7 J Media Econ 51, 59, 62 
(1994); Robert P. Rogers and John R. Woodbury, Market Structure, Program Diversity, and Radio 
Audience Size, 14 Contemp Econ Pol 81, 90 (Jan 1996). 
 161 See 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Commission’s Broadcast 
Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996, 18 FCC Rcd 13620, 13742 ¶¶ 312–15 (2003). 
 162 See Yoo, 78 S Cal L Rev at 693–701 (cited in note 147). 
 163 For surveys, see id at 706–13; Yoo, 19 Yale J Reg at 213–17, 232–37, 260–65 (cited in 
note 123). 
 164 For studies showing that vertical integration enhances consumer welfare, see Tasneem 
Chipty, Vertical Integration, Market Foreclosure, and Consumer Welfare in the Cable Television 
Industry, 91 Am Econ Rev 428, 429 (2001); Eli M. Noam, A Public and Private-Choice Model of 
Broadcasting, 55 Pub Choice 163, 183 (1987); Michael G. Vita, Must Carry Regulations for Cable 
Television Systems: An Empirical Analysis, 12 J Reg Econ 159, 169 (1997). Other studies were 
inconclusive. See, for example, David Waterman and Andrew A. Weiss, The Effects of Vertical 
Integration between Cable Television Systems and Pay Cable Networks, 72 J Econometrics 357, 
391 (1996). One study found a welfare loss of $0.60 per cable subscriber per year. George S. Ford 
and John D. Jackson, Horizontal Concentration and Vertical Integration in the Cable Television 
Industry, 12 Rev Indust Org 501, 515–16 (1997). A recent review of the literature conducted by 
four members of the Federal Trade Commission staff concluded that vertical integration tended 
to be benign or welfare enhancing and described the welfare losses identified by the Ford and 
Jackson study (the only study finding that vertical integration reduced welfare) as miniscule. 
James C. Cooper, et al, Vertical Antitrust Policy as a Problem of Inference, 23 Intl J Indust 
Org 639, 648 (2005). 
2011] Are Those Who Ignore History Doomed to Repeat It? 1677 
vertical integration in television broadcasting—such as the financial 
interest and syndication rules (finsyn) and the Prime Time Access 
Rule (PTAR)—actually restricted program diversity provide ample 
reason for caution.
165
 
These theoretical and empirical debates are rich and hotly 
contested; resolving them far exceeds the scope of this Review. 
Engaging the literature that explores how structural features affect 
media content would offer an account that may be less 
straightforward but would provide greater insights into the dynamics 
of innovation and technological change as well as provide some 
insight into if and when the balance might tip in the other direction. 
The measure of any media policy ultimately depends on the nature of 
the content that the public receives. One would thus expect an 
assessment of these impacts to be part of his proposal. Although Wu 
may well be right that the balance tips in favor of openness and 
vertical disintegration, without a clearer explanation of how to make 
the relevant tradeoffs, readers are left without a clear idea of why that 
is the case or the circumstances under which the balance might change 
(p 305). 
C. The Role of the Government 
Another ambiguity in Wu’s argument is the role of the 
government. As a general matter, he is quite critical of government 
intervention, noting that corporate interests often enlist the 
government’s help when closing down industries (pp 10–11, 145), even 
calling the FCC “among the most useful tools of domination [the 
broadcast] industry has ever invented” (p 128). He sounds similar 
notes when observing that “federal planning is never a good midwife 
for a new industry” (p 132). Even worse, “[a]gain and again in the 
histories I have recounted, the state has shown itself an inferior 
arbiter of what is good for the information industries,” with “[t]he 
federal government’s role in radio and television from the 1920s 
through the 1960s” being “nothing short of a disgrace” (pp 307–08). 
Indeed, he contends that “[g]overnment’s tendency to protect large 
market players amounts to an illegitimate complicity” (p 308). Antitrust 
litigation was the basis for breaking up AT&T. Yet Wu finds antitrust 
inadequate to the task of overseeing information industries (p 303). 
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At other times, however, he is more sanguine about government 
involvement. This is perhaps most evident in his call for regulatory 
intervention in defense of what he calls the “Separations Principle.” Wu 
credits the FCC for a number of policy successes and looks to it to 
provide the primary remedies (pp 309–11). Even the discredited antitrust 
authorities, Wu says, have an important role to play as a “safeguard 
against the FCC’s lapses” (p 312). 
Wu draws support for the Separations Principle from certain 
traditional frameworks. One is common carriage (pp 57–59, 286,  
310–11), which he believes logically extends to all public callings 
(pp 58, 286, 303 n *, 311). In so doing, he fails to address a number of 
limits that have historically been placed on common carriage. As an 
initial matter, the common law duty to provide nondiscriminatory 
service applies only to subscribers; it has not been extended to other 
carriers or other business entities providing complementary services.
166
 
At the same time, this argument overlooks the long line of Supreme 
Court cases rejecting the extension of common carriage to media 
industries on the grounds that doing so would harm free speech rather 
than help it.
167
 Wu must also come to grips with the Supreme Court 
precedent discrediting the notion of public callings as a Lochner-era 
concept that failed to provide a principled way to distinguish 
industries properly subject to common-carriage regulation from those 
that are not.
168
 Despite the efforts of noted scholars to develop a 
principled basis for identifying which industries are properly 
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considered affected with the public interest,
169
 no coherent conceptual 
foundation has emerged. On a more practical level, any invocation of 
common carriage must take into account the controversy it has 
engendered. Courts, regulators, and commentators have struggled to 
implement common-carriage regimes in a coherent manner for more 
than a century.
170
  
At other points, Wu refers to the Separations Principle as “more a 
constitutional than a regulatory framework,” although he takes pains 
to point out that this observation is not intended to invoke the 
principles of the US Constitution (pp 308–09). In fact, Wu advocates 
an intervention that would be far more sweeping. Even though 
Supreme Court precedent clearly regards the Constitution exclusively 
as a limit on state power, not private power, Wu openly calls for 
governmental intervention against private power (pp 199, 300–02, 
310). Such a position contradicts traditional liberal principles in which 
the individual is logically prior to the state as well as the fundamental 
liberal commitment (recognized by Wu at p 267) that the coercive 
power of the state poses far greater dangers to liberty than private 
exercises of power ever can.
171
 Even those sympathetic to Wu’s policy 
recommendations acknowledge that basing them on the Constitution 
would require nothing short of a revolution in doctrine.
172
 
In fact, what Wu suggests is a new constitutional principle is really 
an old regulatory one. US policymakers have long experimented with 
approaches that require structural separation between the network 
and those who would provide services over the network. The FCC 
imposed just such a structural separation requirement in its first and 
second Computer Inquiries.
173
 It also underlay the key provision in the 
1984 consent decree settling the landmark antitrust case against 
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AT&T requiring that the Bell System separate its long-distance, 
equipment-manufacturing, and local telephone businesses into 
separate companies.
174
 
Over time, however, policymakers have begun to recognize that 
vertical integration often creates important benefits that cannot be 
realized under a structural separation mandate.
175
 Leading examples 
include the initial deployment of digital protocols in the core of the 
telephone network and vertical switching services such as caller ID.
176
 
The delays in introducing these services created annual welfare losses 
in excess of $1 billion.
177
 It is for this reason that many scholars have 
criticized structural separation.
178
 It is also the reason that the FCC 
abolished the requirement in its third Computer Inquiry.
179
 Given the 
high degree of similarity between these issues, Wu’s proposal might be 
expected to explain why the considerations underlying the FCC’s 
previous decision to abandon structural separation as too costly do 
not still apply. 
On the most basic level, however, Wu’s proposal must come to 
grips with a more fundamental problem: anyone looking to the 
government as a remedy to private power must address the fact that 
the same economic characteristics that allow private actors to 
dominate markets also allow them to dominate politics as well, a 
problem that Charles Lindblom called “circularity.”
180
 Although Wu 
suggests that the Separations Principle is a way to preempt politics 
(p 304), more traditional analyses of regulatory behavior raise serious 
doubts as to whether politics and technology policy can be rendered 
distinct. Indeed, instead of mimicking David versus Goliath, many of 
the historical episodes that Wu describes represented a clash of 
opposing corporate interests (including a majority of the most recent 
ones, such as Apple versus IBM, the AOL–Time Warner merger, and 
the modern debate over network neutrality). Wu’s admonition that 
                                                                                                                      
 174 United States v AT&T, 552 F Supp 131, 196, 223–34 (DDC 1982) (describing the 
provisions of the consent decree), affd Maryland v United States, 460 US 1001 (1983). 
 175 Amendment of Sections 64.702 of Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Third Computer 
Inquiry), 104 FCC2d 958, 1002–11 ¶¶ 79–97 (1986), affd and modified by 2 FCC Rcd 3035, 3037 ¶ 10 
(1987), vacd and remd under the name of California v FCC, 905 F2d 1217, 1238–39 (9th Cir 1990). 
 176 Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 Harv J L & Tech 1, 24–25 (2005). 
 177 Jerry A. Hausman, Valuing the Effect of Regulation on New Services in 
Telecommunications, 1997 Brookings Papers on Econ Activity: Microecon 1, 3, 10, 14–15. 
 178 See, for example, Robert W. Crandall and J. Gregory Sidak, Is Structural Separation of 
Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers Necessary for Competition?, 19 Yale J Reg 335, 364–89 
(2002); Warren G. Lavey, Ending Structural Separation for Telephone Companies, 18 Conn L 
Rev 81, 113 (1985). 
 179 Third Computer Inquiry, 104 FCC2d at 964 ¶ 3 (cited in 175). 
 180 Charles E. Lindblom, Politics and Markets: The World’s Political-Economic Systems 201–21 
(Basic Books 1977). 
2011] Are Those Who Ignore History Doomed to Repeat It? 1681 
“government’s only proper role is a check on private power, never as 
an aid to it” (p 308) provides little guidance when private power is 
implicated on both sides of every policy issue. Moreover, past 
experience with restrictions on vertical integration has shown that 
Wu’s Separations Principle would involve government intervention to 
standardize interfaces, mediate disputes over access, and enforce 
structural separation,
181
 interventions that can only be characterized as 
regulatory rather than constitutional.
182
 
D. Normative Assessment of Openness 
Another of the book’s signal characteristics is that it generally 
discusses openness (particularly with respect to vertical integration) in 
laudatory terms (pp 111, 195, 292–93, 305–06). Indeed, the book was 
supposed to be named Open until Knopf published Andre Agassi’s 
autobiography under that title the previous year.
183
 At some moments, 
however, Wu seems more ambivalent. Open media tends to fragment 
rather than unite a nation (pp 214–15). Moguls step in to centralize an 
industry when people are unhappy with the quality of content or the 
reliability of a service; indeed, the arrival of the centralizing mogul 
“heralds a golden age in the life of the new technology” (p 10). In 
addition, “the closing is driven by a hunger for quality and scale—the 
desire to improve, even perfect the medium and realize its full 
potential, which is limited by openness, for all its virtues” (p 78). Wu 
credits the new (closed) radio industry for “creating a broad 
listenership for quality programming” (p 84). Centralizing innovation 
improves coordination and reduces waste (pp 110–11, 306). Wu singles 
out for special praise the locked-down vision of computing embodied 
in the Apple Macintosh, iPod, iPad, and iPhone, which delivered 
unrivaled functionality and a seamless user experience (pp 278, 292). 
Indeed, the most casual review of the contemporary economy reveals 
a wide range of practices that completely span the spectrum. 
In short, the book candidly recognizes that embracing openness 
necessarily involves a tradeoff. In so doing, it naturally invites inquiry 
into whether conditions exist that might tip the balance the other way. 
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Fortunately, the scholarly literature on standardization and modularity 
has advanced analytical frameworks that can provide some traction on 
this question. Consider first the theory of optimal standardization.
184
 
Standardization is largely a function of the heterogeneity of consumer 
preferences. If everyone wants the same thing, one can satisfy all of 
their preferences with a single network optimized in the way that 
everyone wants. As what people want becomes more diverse, one 
would naturally expect the services that the network is offering to 
become more diverse in response.
185
 If that is the case, shifts away from 
the way the current network is designed may represent nothing more 
than the network’s attempt to evolve to meet consumer demand. 
From this perspective, experiments with new standards should be 
regarded not necessarily as anticompetitive but as a potential sign of a 
healthy environment for innovation.
186
 Indeed, if demand is sufficiently 
heterogeneous, firms generally avoid me-too strategies, preferring to 
pursue approaches that distinguish them from their competitors. 
When this is the case, industries are more likely to reflect a mix of 
business strategies rather than uniform tactics. Thus, the fact that one 
firm has adopted an open architecture may make it more likely that at 
least some of its competitors will adopt a closed one.
187
 
Further insights emerge from modularity theory,
188
 which suggests 
that modular architectures are not appropriate if the tasks constituting 
the overall process exhibit too many interdependencies.
189
 In addition, 
changes in the technological environment may cause a previously 
modular architecture to break down.
190
 A growing number of theorists 
have recognized that the Internet’s layered architecture establishes a 
form of modularity that allows each actor to optimize its own 
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behavior locally. The problem is that when these individually rational 
decisions combine and interact with one another, they can lead to 
aggregate behavior that is suboptimal.
191
 
Rather than extolling the virtues of open architectures in the 
abstract, these frameworks provide a basis for a better understanding 
of both the benefits of open architectures and their limitations. 
Although not as simple and straightforward as the view of openness 
embodied in the Cycle, the additional nuance adds power to the analysis 
and makes it more likely that any decisions will reflect good policy. 
E. The (In)evitability of the Cycle 
The Master Switch provides a different perspective on the frequent 
debates among innovation scholars over whether technological 
progress primarily results from “demand pull” or “technology push.” 
Instead, Wu offers a more charismatic vision in which corporate moguls 
are the primary movers of technological change (pp 14, 29). Despite the 
personality-driven nature of this change model, Wu frequently speaks 
of the Cycle as if it is unavoidable, describing it as some inexorable 
force (pp 7, 252). At other times, however, Wu concedes that the Cycle 
is not inevitable (pp 85, 156). Sometimes industries skip the initial open 
phase, as occurred with television (p 154). Corporate moguls seeking to 
assert control over an industry sometimes fail, as happened in AOL’s 
acquisition of Time Warner (pp 264–68), and sometimes promote 
openness, as Ted Turner did with respect to cable television (pp 208–11).  
Like Wu’s other exceptions to the simple version of the Cycle, 
these deviations invite further analysis. If the forces opening and 
closing industries are supposed to be inexorable, policy analysts 
should be very interested to determine what caused the industry to 
deviate from the expected pattern. Acknowledging the possibility of 
variations also has major implications for Wu’s policy 
recommendations, because it is the supposed relentlessness of the 
Cycle that provides the primary impetus for taking action to forestall 
the outcome that Wu fears. 
Part of the explanation lies in the fact that openness has its 
charismatic figures as well. Although Wu describes Ted Turner’s role in 
turning cable into a viable alternative to broadcast television, many 
other figures go unmentioned. Many of the greatest successes of the 
open-source movement were pushed by strong central figures, such as 
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Richard Stallman. The account of Google does not even mention 
Google founders Sergey Brin and Larry Page, an omission particularly 
interesting in light of Page’s reemergence as the head of Google 
following the book’s publication. Even the Internet protocol suite, 
Wu’s archetype for the ideal open architecture, was greatly influenced 
by Vint Cerf’s steady and visionary guidance, although he too is 
downplayed in Wu’s narrative. Clearly, bold leadership was not the 
exclusive province of the established corporate interests. 
Any claims about the continuing dominance of incumbents must 
also be viewed in light of how frequently and quickly the leading 
players in the technology player have changed. In the 1980s, the 
companies regarded as dominant included IBM and AT&T (as a long-
distance company). Although both continue to exist, neither is as 
influential as during the 1980s, and neither is currently regarded as a 
market leader. During the 1990s, AOL was a dominant industry force, 
and now it is struggling to remain relevant. The other behemoths of 
the 1990s, Microsoft and Intel, now face vibrant competition from 
Google, who in turn is facing challenges from the next generation of 
upstarts, led by Facebook and Netflix.
192
 
A deeper look at the history reveals the limitations of focusing 
only on broad patterns to the exclusion of the detail that inevitably 
accompanies any industry. Rather than focusing on a single, abstract 
pattern, policymakers would be better served by trying to understand 
the complex forces driving innovation and technological change. Only 
then can we understand the dynamics of the various industry cycles 
and how best to address them. 
CONCLUSION 
The great American architect Daniel Burnham is reported to 
have said, “Make no little plans. They have no magic to stir men’s 
blood.”
193
 In his own field, Tim Wu has taken this advice to heart. In 
attempting to discover a general pattern that describes the path along 
which every technology must inevitably travel, he has authored a book 
with grand ambitions. If successful, his efforts to distill from four 
disparate communications industries a single, unified pattern of 
technological and business practices would be a major accomplishment. 
The more general the result, the more powerful the analysis becomes. 
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The breadth of the book’s vision is thus one of its greatest 
strengths. At the same time, however, it presents some of its greatest 
challenges. History is notoriously untidy, and all too often real-world 
facts stubbornly refuse to conform to what would otherwise be a 
terrific story. 
Rather than trying to fit all of these industries into a single 
Procrustean pattern, a more detailed assessment of the history might 
suggest replacing a model that is deterministic and general with one 
that is more nuanced and contingent. This approach would search for 
the many evolutionary paths that an industry might follow as well as a 
better understanding of the factors that cause industries to fall into 
one pattern or the other. The fact that The Master Switch is aimed at a 
general audience instead of at academics partially justifies the 
simplified presentation of the episodes discussed in the book. That 
said, the book is based almost entirely on a historical claim, so the 
force of its policy recommendations depends entirely on the accuracy 
and completeness of its treatment of the historical record. 
A more measured and nuanced approach would lead to policy 
implications that are less sweeping and categorical, and thus less likely 
to yield the simple policy inferences that policymakers and policy 
advocates seek. That said, adding complexity can produce a theory 
that more accurately describes real-world outcomes and thus can 
provide a better foundation for sound public policy. 
